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We  investigate  the  long-run  historical  pattern  of R&D-outlays  by  reviewing  aggregate  growth  rates  and
historical cases  of particular  R&D  projects,  following  the historical-institutional  approach  of  Chandler
(1962),  North  (1981)  and Williamson  (1985).  We  ﬁnd  that  even  the  earliest  R&D-projects  used  non-
insigniﬁcant  cash  outlays  and  that  until  the  1970s  aggregate  R&D  outlays  grew  far  faster  than  GDP,
despite  ﬁve  well-known  challenges  that  implied  that  R&D  could  only be  ﬁnanced  with  cash,  for  which
no  perfect  market  existed:  the  presence  of  sunk  costs,  real uncertainty,  long  time  lags,  adverse  selection,
and  moral  hazard.  We then  review  a  wide  variety  of organisational  forms  and  institutional  instruments
that  ﬁrms  historically  have  used  to  overcome  these  ﬁnancing  obstacles,  and without  which  the  enormous
growth  of R&D outlays  since  the  nineteenth  century  would  not  have  been  possible.eywords:
&D-project ﬁnancing-history
&D-ﬁnancing institutions
unk costs
istorical R&D-project cost case studies
ritain
nited States
© 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.. Introduction
A key characteristic of large high-technology ﬁrms today is that
hey hold enormous amounts of cash. In 2012, for example, Apple
eld $121bn, Google $47bn, Facebook $11bn and Amazon $5bn in
ash.1 These ﬁrms may  have many reasons for keeping such cash
iles (Myers and Majluf, 1984); we will argue that a key reason is the
mportance of R&D to these ﬁrms, because it does not involve any
ankable collateral, has a high degree of uncertainty, and long open-
nded time lags, and faces several other challenges such as adverse
election and moral hazard. Therefore R&D has to be ﬁnanced with
ash rather than capital.The R&D-ﬁnancing issue that these technology giants are
ddressing with their cash piles is a classic problem that histori-
ally all R&D-intensive ﬁrms have had to address. Nowadays, the
∗ Correspondence to: Department of Economic History, London School of Eco-
omics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom.
el.: +44 20 7955 7047; fax: +44 20 7955 7730.
E-mail address: g.bakker@lse.ac.uk
1 Amounts rounded to the nearest billion. “Technology giants at war,” The
conomist, 1 December 2012, p. 28. As percentage of annual revenue the cash piles
ere, respectively, 78, 9, 99 and 228 percent, and as percentage of the ﬁrms’ market
alue 22, 5, 21 and 18 percent.
048-7333/$ – see front matter ©  2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2013.07.017scale of the cash piles that high-tech ﬁrms keep has reached enor-
mous proportions. Apple’s cash mountain, for example, is higher
than the GDPs of tens of different nations. This paper aims to give
long-run historical insight into how we  got here.
We examine what R&D spending looked like in the very long run,
since c. 1750 and how, given the substantial ﬁnancing obstacles,
ﬁrms have been able to incur large R&D outlays on particular, highly
uncertain projects. In order to answer this question, we explore
how we can conceptualise R&D-outlays to understand their long-
run historical evolution and we  investigate what insights we can
get into the ﬁnancial and organisational nature of R&D-outlays by
looking into particular historical cases, not unlike Chandler (1962),
North (1981) and Williamson (1985) did to examine, respectively,
organisations, institutions, and transactions. We also aim to get
comparative historical insight into the order of magnitude of the
costs of these particular R&D-projects.
These research questions are worthwhile for two main reasons.
First, they are important because a focus on the long run allows us to
see trends and changes that are not visible in the short run. Joseph
Schumpeter, for example, argued that history should be included
in the training of all economists. He understood ‘economic analy-
sis’ as a combination of history, statistics and theory, and he wrote
late in his career that ‘if, starting my work in economics afresh, I
were told that I could study only one of the three but could have my
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hoice, it would be economic history that I should choose.’2 Innova-
ion studies scholars such as von Tunzelmann (1995), Freeman and
oete (1997), and Freeman and Louca (2001), likewise have stud-
ed history. Historians and social scientists such as Chandler, North
nd Williamson use history to identify and examine organisational,
nstitutional and transactional change that we cannot see if we only
xamine the short run. So if we want to get deep insight into how
he arrangements for ﬁnancing innovation can change and what
ight drive their dynamics, it does not sufﬁce to study the period
ince the 1990s or even since the 1970s. We  need to go further back
n time.
Second, historical case studies can offer us unique insights,
specially since each R&D-project is to some extent, almost per
eﬁnition a unique, particular case that in many respects is incom-
arable with other projects. Much existing work on R&D is based
n analysing large data-sets of aggregate annual R&D-outlays with
conometric methods. In this paper we aim to show what additional
nsights we can gain by taking the project as the unit of analysis and
tudying particular cases in the long run, in a qualitative analytical-
istorical way following Chandler, North and Williamson’s work on
he dynamics of organisations, institutions, and transactions. These
istorical case studies can also give us an awareness of changes in
cale, time lags and organisational forms in the long run.
In this paper the project is the unit of analysis, and not the
rganisation (Chandler), the institutional arrangement (North), the
ransaction (Williamson), or other parameters. Following Chan-
ler’s historical case study approach, these cases are particular,
nique cases as such and are not meant to constitute a representa-
ive sample. Nevertheless, from these particular cases we  can still
ake some inferences. A particular project with large cash outlays,
or example, can potentially refute notions such as that large scale
&D was not done in the eighteenth century, or that ﬁrms in a par-
icular country lacked the resources to carry out the largest-scale
&D projects (Popper, 1935).
Besides the historical case study method, we also use economic
istory methods to gain comparative insight into R&D expendi-
ures over time, expressing them as GDP-deﬂated costs, as social
pportunity costs and, ﬁnally, as a fraction of an intuitive non-R&D
ndex-case.
The main empirical evidence we examine is from Britain and
he United States since about 1750, though we like to emphasise
hat we do not endeavour to give a systematic comparison of R&D
n those two countries, for which other papers can be consulted
see, for example, Mowery and Rosenberg, 1989; Edgerton and
orrocks, 1994). We  simply use the two countries to get broader
nsight into the general ﬁnance mechanisms. The United States is
hosen because it is the largest country in the world in GDP-terms
ince the early twentieth century, and Britain because it was  a tech-
ological leader in many areas until the mid-twentieth century and
as never occupied during the period examined, unlike Germany,
rance or Japan.
We  do not endeavour to give a complete and encyclopaedic
eview of each and every organisational form and institutional
nstrument that ﬁrms adopted. We  merely try to review informally
ome main forms and provide a historical meta-narrative (O’Brien,
001). We  use a holistic approach and develop a new overarching
ramework, showing how all elements ﬁt together, even if indi-
idual elements of this framework have obviously been studied
reviously. This is a work of history that aims to engage with the
conomics of technical change and innovation studies (ETIS). It does
ot aim to be an economic or management study, and not a standard
nnovation studies paper either.
2 Joseph Schumpeter, as quoted in McCraw (2006, p. 261).2 (2013) 1793– 1814
This paper aims to contribute to innovation studies by showing
how a long-run historical perspective, following the tradition of
Nick von Tunzelmann and Chris Freeman, can give us some addi-
tional insights with respect to present-day studies. We  return to
very basic facts about R&D. Our approach is not economic; we focus
on practical problems that ﬁrms faced and show the role of mar-
ket imperfections. We  aim to show how the current R&D-ﬁnancing
framework emerged from the past and how the factors we discuss
are also important for policy and practice and for future experimen-
tation with organisational forms and institutional instruments.
What follows ﬁrst reviews the most important obstacles ﬁrms
encountered when they wanted to ﬁnance R&D. In the next section
we ﬁrst examine growth rates in the very long run to identify trends,
and then several particular historical R&D-projects for which we
could trace the total cash outlays. In the subsequent section we
review several organisational forms and institutional instruments
that ﬁrms have historically adopted to overcome the R&D-ﬁnancing
problem. A ﬁnal section concludes.
2. Challenges to the ﬁnance of research
We  argue that the ﬁnancing of R&D is made difﬁcult by ﬁve
challenges: the presence of sunk costs, real uncertainty, long and
open-ended time lags between outlays and pay-offs, adverse selec-
tion, and moral hazard. We  will discuss these in turn.
2.1. Sunk costs
Historically, a formidable challenge for R&D-ﬁnancing has been
the fact that costs are sunk (Sutton, 1998). Sunk costs are costs that
must be incurred to achieve a project’s aim, that are incurred once,
and that cannot be recovered upon exit. R&D-costs are mostly sunk:
if the outlays do not lead to a marketable product, little residual
value is left. Furthermore, R&D costs are incurred ‘internationally’
and do not have to be incurred again with the entry of each new
market, as is the case with, for example, advertising (i.e. the results
of R&D costs, the successful R&D-projects, can be marketed inter-
nationally) and the results of R&D can to some extent be protected
against imitation by intellectual property and trade secret law.
The small residual value of an uncompleted R&D-project also
implies that there is little collateral. Given this absence of collateral,
given the absence of a cash ﬂow from which to make regular inter-
est payments, and given that the sum needed is not precisely known
ex-ante, banks generally are unwilling to provide loans for R&D.
The level of sunk R&D-costs differed between industries and varied
over time (Kamien and Schwartz, 1982, p. 85).3 Although precise
evidence is lacking, undoubtedly costs of R&D-projects increased
over time and over the course of a technological trajectory. In the
empirical section below we aim to gain historical understanding of
the scale and growth of sunk costs in the long-run.
Technical or generic solutions to the sunk costs aspect of R&D
have been developed, and most are applied nowadays by venture
capital ﬁrms (Table 1). They include funding in stages, whereby
initially only a limited sum is committed, until a certain milestone
is reached that gives more information about the R&D-trajectory,
after which a decision is made about whether to sink more money,
and so on. This is not unrelated to the option approach, in which
entrepreneurs see an R&D-outlay as the buying of a call option
allowing them to decide at a later time whether to continue.
Hartmann and Hassan (2006) provide a detailed study on the preva-
lence of this approach in the pharmaceutical industry.
3 For historical studies of the role of sunk costs in particular industries, see Bakker
(2005).
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Table 1
Selected generic solutions to the R&D-ﬁnancing problem, by obstacle mitigated.
Obstacle Solutions
Inherent factors Sunk costs Staged funding
Mile stones
Write-offs
Options
Government funding
Nested uncertainty Options
Patents
Collusion
Joint R&D
Time lags Largest amounts last
Green lights
IPO
Annual write-offs
Transactional
factors
Adverse selection Who  initiates (M&A)
Scientists on board ﬁnancer
Personal links / social control
Moral hazard Board seats
Company visits
Large equity stakes top
scientists & managers
Source: Identiﬁed from the literature; see, for example, O’Sullivan (2005) and Lerner
(2009).G. Bakker / Research P
The accounting practice of immediately writing off R&D-outlays,
aking them out of existing cash ﬂow, also mitigates the ﬁnancing
roblems associated with sunk costs.4 They will not have an effect
n company ﬁnancial performance indicators in future years, unlike
physical) capital investments: if an R&D-project fails, few write-
ffs have to be made, and this may  also help mitigate a sunk costs
ias in decision making. Government ﬁnancing of R&D-outlays is
nother tried and tested solution, prevalent, for example, in the
efence sector.
.2. Nested uncertainty
Uncertainty was an important challenge for the ﬁnancing of R&D
rojects. Although we cannot measure it exactly historically, we  can
dentify what factors may  have increased or decreased uncertainty.
&D is almost deﬁned by real (uninsurable) uncertainty (Knight,
921). We  identify here four types of successive real uncertainty:
echnical, strategic, market and proﬁt uncertainty.5 Technically, it
s uncertain whether R&D-outlays will lead to a working innova-
ion, and if they do whether this innovation is what was originally
peciﬁed or expected. Even if successful in technical terms, the ﬁrm
aces strategic uncertainty, uncertainty depending on the actions of
n intelligent opponent: are competitors doing similar research and
f so, could they launch their product ﬁrst? Even when these two
ncertainties are resolved the ﬁrm faces market uncertainty about
hether the market for the innovation remains as it was  expected
o be when the R&D-project commenced. And when the preceding
hree uncertainties have been resolved, the ﬁrm still faces proﬁt
ncertainty about whether its business model is able to capture
he value of the innovation.
The problem of real, uninsurable uncertainty has been
oignantly summed up by Joseph Schumpeter (1942, p. 82):
Long-range investing under rapidly changing conditions, espe-
ially under conditions that change or may  change at any moment
nder the impact of new commodities and technologies, is like
hooting at a target that is not only indistinct but moving-and
oving jerkily at that.” Because of real uncertainty Keynes (1936)
rgued that businesspersons needed animal spirits, hunches, to
ake action and invest in an uncertain world (see also Freeman and
oete, 1997, pp. 242–264). Pure, extensive and complete rational
alculation was impossible and led to paralysis.
Arrow (1962) identiﬁes uncertainty also as one of the three rea-
ons why, in his view, the allocation of resources for R&D in an
conomy is suboptimal at the aggregate level.6 Williamson (1985)
dentiﬁes uncertainty as one of the key three dimensions that
etermine transaction costs; the other two are the frequency of
ransactions and asset speciﬁcity, which is the value of the under-
ying asset outside of the particular transactional relation. Clearly,
&D-projects score very low on all three dimensions: they are
4 This is mostly the case in the United States since 1974. Some other countries
llow the capitalisation of some separable and later stage R&D, and ﬁrms can write
hese expenses off over several years; see Lev (1999).
5 Technical, market and proﬁt uncertainty can be found back in Kamien and
chwartz (1982, pp. 109–110), who  implicitly include strategic uncertainties under
arket uncertainties. See also Lazonick (1991) on productive and market uncer-
ainty. Besides the project uncertainty this section focuses on, one can of course
lso distinguish more general uncertainties further removed from the direct envi-
onment of the R&D-project such as wars, natural disasters, depressions, ﬁnancial
rises or inﬂation.
6 Indivisibilities and inappropriability are the others. The ﬁrst is partially dealt
ith under sunk costs, and we argue scale per se should not matter, because if mar-
ets  for R&D-ﬁnance were perfect, ﬁrms should be able to undertake R&D-projects
f  almost any size. We group inappropriability under proﬁt uncertainty here because
t  is a factor in whether a ﬁrm will be able to capture the proﬁts of its innovation.
rrow does not explicitly address the problems of sunk costs and the time lag. See
lso Arrow (1983).Note: The solutions are not mutually exclusive, they were often used simultaneously.
The solutions mentioned are examples; they do not form an exhaustive set.
highly uncertain, the frequency of transactions is close to one, and
they are highly asset speciﬁc.
Historically, some developments and institutions have miti-
gated real uncertainty, while others have increased it (Table 2).
The net effect is unclear. Though undoubtedly scientiﬁc advances,
patents and market research have all mitigated uncertainty, the
constant emergence of new technological trajectories, antitrust
laws and the growth of highly income-elastic products and ser-
vices may  have increased it. In the United States, for example, from
the late nineteenth century antitrust laws increased uncertainty
by preventing collusion, while the resulting merger wave reduced
uncertainty by taking out and using competitors’ R&D pipelines.
Some institutions worked both ways: prizes reduced proﬁt uncer-
tainty for the innovator by guaranteeing payment for success, and
for the prize-ﬁnancer by setting a maximum payment for the
innovation; by contrast, they increased strategic uncertainty for
innovator and prize-ﬁnancer alike, by attracting many competitors
to the race.
Technical solutions to the uncertainty problem included the
option approach, in which R&D was seen as a process to reduce
uncertainty in successive steps, or literally keep development
options open in the face of competitive threats.
Collusion has sometimes been an effective means for mitigat-
ing strategic uncertainty. In interwar Switzerland, for example, the
drug ﬁrms Hoffman-LaRoche and Ciba had a mutually exclusive
agreement in which one focused on vitamins, the other on hor-
mones. Edgerton (1987) argues that British ﬁrms in the interwar
period often used R&D-projects as bargaining tools when negotiat-
ing with competitors. Joint R&D projects are another way  to reduce
strategic uncertainty. Patents, of course, reduce proﬁt uncertainty
by increasing the costs for competitors to imitate the innovator.
2.3. The time lag
The ‘roundaboutness’ of R&D, the time lag between outlays
and eventual proﬁts, if any, is another important challenge to the
ﬁnancing of R&D. We  discuss it here separately because it was
already identiﬁed as a key problem by economists such as Schum-
peter, Frank Knight, John Maynard Keynes and John Hicks, because
it is historically measurable, and, ﬁnally, because ﬁrms do take
1796 G. Bakker / Research Policy 42 (2013) 1793– 1814
Table 2
Taxonomy of successive types of uncertainty of an R&D project’s outcome.
Type of uncertainty Mitigated by Increased by
Technical uncertainty Advances in science and technology Decreasing returns within a technological
trajectoryNew techniques that increase effectiveness
of R&D (e.g. periodic table, DNA
sequencing)
Longer time lags
Option approach
Strategic uncertainty Competitive intelligence Competition policy
Product development announcements Prizes
Oligopoly
Joint R&D; M&A; collusion
Market uncertainty Market research Luxury products with high income elasticities
Shorter time lags
Prizes
Proﬁt uncertainty Adequate business models Unstable government policies and regulation
Intellectual property rights Unstable tax regimes
Prizes Piracy/imitation
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as rear-view mirrors and bumpers ﬁrst and critical elements such
as an engine last, in order to achieve the shortest time-to-market.ource: Author; see also Kamien and Schwartz (1982), Lazonick (1991) and Moser (
ulti-stage time lags into account when making decisions about
&D-ﬁnancing.
Historically speaking the time lag is important, as never before
n history did ﬁrms face such long and uncertain multi-stage time
ags and such roundabout production as in the period since 1750.
t is a unique feature of many modern economies that ﬁrms are
illing to take resources out of the immediate production process
or many years, only for uncertain beneﬁts in a distant future. One
ould argue that only modern society, a society with modern insti-
utions and modern economic growth enabled private ﬁrms to deal
ith these enormous time lags.
R&D is characterised by a long, multi-stage time lag between
ash outlays and cash ﬂowing in (Holmstrom, 1989). This lag can
e divided into the lags between the start of research and a proven
nvention, the proven invention and a working prototype, the
rst prototype and one that can be easily manufactured, the ﬁnal
rototype and start of production, the start of production and com-
encement of sales, commencement of sales and revenues coming
n, and, ﬁnally, incoming revenues and proﬁts. At each point a deci-
ion is made whether to continue, and successively more cash is
eeded. The exact length of these nested lags cannot be predicted
n advance, and the external and internal/opportunity costs of cash
ay  vary over these lags.
The time lag has been noted as a fundamental economic dynamic
y economists such as Schumpeter, Knight, Keynes, Arthur Lewis
nd Hicks (von Tunzelmann, 1995, pp. 66–67). Schumpeter (1911,
. 42), for example, noted that “every period operates with goods
hich an earlier period prepared for it, and in every period goods
re produced for use in the next.” His later observation that long-
ange investing is like shooting at a jerkily moving target (see the
receding section) also underlines the importance he attributes
o the time lag. Likewise, Knight (1921) noted that uncertainty
ncreased sharply as the time lag between product design, produc-
ion and sales increased, and that the time lag itself was  therefore an
mportant challenge for entrepreneurs. Keynes (1936, p. 46) wrote
hat “the entrepreneur has to form the best expectations he can as
o what the consumers will be prepared to pay when he is ready to
upply them after the elapse of what can be a lengthy period; and
e has no choice but to be guided by these expectations, if he is to
roduce at all by processes which occupy time.” Hicks (1973) like-
ise rejects the notion of a timeless equilibrium and distinguishes
etween a construction phase with no output, and an operation
hase in which revenues need to cover the sacriﬁces of the con-
truction phase as well as its own output. Long, open-ended time.
lags make ﬁrms reluctant to invest, because recalling one’s money
is difﬁcult, as cash is not coming in until the end. These economists
refer mainly to all ﬁxed outlays, while for R&D the roundaboutness
and thus the time lag’s effects will be even more prominent.
Given the nature of R&D it is difﬁcult to establish the direction
and extent of changes in the average time lag. von Tunzelmann
(1978), deﬁning it as the time between patent application and ﬁrst
commercial introduction, suggests that there is no clear evidence
that this time lag has been shortening since the Industrial Revo-
lution. The time lag for steam engines and related machinery was
rarely more than ﬁve to six years, much lower than for inventions
with similar intensity in late nineteenth and twentieth century,
according to von Tunzelmann (see also Mansﬁeld, 1968, p. 110).
What has increased is the roundaboutness of the R&D process. Dur-
ing the Industrial Revolution inventors and innovators often were
the same persons, and this is far less likely to be the case today.
Over technological trajectories time lags often increased as the
‘low-hanging fruit’ disappeared. Examples are the development of
catalytic cracking (Enos, 1962) and the aircraft and pharmaceutical
industries during the twentieth century.7
Obviously, the time lag is not fully controllable. Scherer (1967)
and Kamien and Schwartz (1982, p. 132) note diminishing returns
to the time compression of R&D. The more time is reduced, the
higher the costs, as one cannot await the outcomes of previous
experiments before proceeding with new ones. At the Edison lab in
the late nineteenth century, for example, the time scale of experi-
mentation was  enormous. To make carbon ﬁlament 6000 different
plant species were tried and for the nickel-iron battery 50,000 sep-
arate experiments were performed (Dodgson and Gann, 2010, p.
91).
Generic solutions for the time lag include immediate write-offs
of R&D-outlays, having a clearly deﬁned ‘green light’ point, at which
a decision will be made about whether or not to sink substan-
tial amounts of cash, and the IPO for start-up companies, which
allows investors to cash in before the ﬁrm has a positive cash ﬂow
(Table 1). R&D of complex products is sometimes timed so that the
critical elements and largest cash outlays are made closest to mar-
ket. Japanese car makers, for example, often develop details such7 See the U.S. case studies in the next section.
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.4. Information asymmetries
Besides the three inherent factors, two well-known transac-
ional obstacles inhibit R&D ﬁnancing as a result of information
symmetries between innovator and ﬁnancer: adverse selection
nd moral hazard (Goodacre and Tonks, 1995; Hall, 2002).8 Given
hat historically these factors have been important, since a great
eal of historical evidence can be interpreted as efforts to mitigate
nformation asymmetries,9 we ﬁnd it important to discuss them
ere.
Adverse selection involves hidden information: the ﬁnancer
ften cannot objectively establish the likelihood of a technical ven-
ure’s success because the innovator is better informed. On average,
rojects offered for external ﬁnance therefore have a lower proba-
ility of success. To remedy this, the ﬁnancer is not likely to demand
 higher stake, because purveyors of the most problematic projects
ould most readily accept such demands. Matters are made more
ifﬁcult because generally innovators will be reluctant to disclose
nformation (Kamien and Schwartz 1982, p. 28), and this reluctance
s probably higher for better projects.
Generic solutions to adverse selection include investor initia-
ion, in which the investor approaches entrepreneurs or ﬁrms with
romising projects, rather than the other way around, a technique
lso commonplace today in mergers and acquisitions. Scientists on
he boards of external ﬁnancers, ﬁnancing a speciﬁc industry, and
nancing with a consortium of informed investors are other tried
nd tested ways to reduce adverse selection.
Although historical quantitative indications of adverse selec-
ion are difﬁcult to come by, Beatty et al. (1995) ﬁnd that for
esearch and Development Finance Organisations (RDFOs), U.S.
egal vehicles that ﬁrms can use to ﬁnance a particular, well-deﬁned
ater-stage R&D-project externally, the cost of formation is two to
hree times that of ‘seasoned equity offerings of similar size’.10 This
uggests very high information costs, and Beatty c.s. ﬁnd that any
rm with a sufﬁcient cash ﬂow or pile is likely to ﬁnance R&D
nternally and not use an RDFO.
The second information asymmetry, moral hazard, involves
idden action. Ex-post an innovator could take more risk than
riginally agreed and obtain larger proﬁts if successful, while the
xternal ﬁnanciers would bear the additional risk of bankruptcy.
lternatively, the scientist might choose to maximise fame and
ecognition by pursuing scientiﬁcally rather than commercially
nteresting leads. Financers have often lacked the expertise to
stablish what the innovator was actually doing. Large ﬁrms and
ealthy individuals could alleviate moral hazard more than others
ecause they could invest more of their own resources in an R&D-
roject and so attract outside investors (Kamien and Schwartz,
982, p. 85).
Again, since we ﬁnd substantial historical evidence of ﬁrms
eveloping ways to mitigate moral hazard, this must have been
n important problem for the ﬁnancing of innovations historically.
or in-house research, solutions to moral hazard included individ-
al incentives such as bonuses, combined with large ﬁxed or group
ayments to ensure teamwork continued. Lab architecture has also
een important. In the late nineteenth century Bayer, for exam-
le, designed a new lab architecture by arranging the chemists in
orkbenches laid out in a U-shaped pattern with partitions up to
hemists’ shoulders (Beer, 1958). This allowed a manager to see
hat the chemists were doing, and communication was  possible,
8 See also Arrow (1962), for an early discussion of these as ‘the moral factor’.
9 See below.
10 In effect, the cash-constrained low marginal tax rate R&D ﬁrm sells the tax
eductibility of its R&D to investors with high marginal tax rates (see Section 4.1 for
 more detailed discussion).2 (2013) 1793– 1814 1797
while the researchers could still work individually and indepen-
dently. This procedure prevented researchers from pursuing their
own agenda or leaving the ﬁrm with hidden inventions. For exter-
nal ﬁnance, generic solutions have included convertible debt, large
equity stakes for the key scientists, board seats for the investors,
and regular site visits.
3. Historical evidence
The ﬁve obstacles meant that innovators needed cash, without
underlying collateral, not capital. No well-functioning market for
cash with a law of one price existed. The implicit costs of cash dif-
fered widely between ﬁrms, and market interest rates and stock
returns only set a ﬂoor under pay-offs investors expected from
R&D-projects. Present-day empirical evidence shows that R&D-
outlays are generally sensitive to cash ﬂow or cash piles of ﬁrms
(see Section 3.3).
Given that cash was crucial for R&D ﬁnancing, and that it gen-
erally was  tied to information, personal contacts or organisational
structure when it was  made available for R&D, the mechanisms
that enabled the accumulation of cash and helped it being used
to ﬁnance R&D were important. There simply did not exist a mar-
ket mechanism that could generate cash for any R&D-project with
a positive expected value. Little is actually known historically
about these cash outlays, their size, their scale and how they were
ﬁnanced. We  aim to gain historical insight by looking at long-run
R&D growth rates and at historical case studies of R&D-projects in
Britain and the United States.
Two  key reasons why the market for R&D cash did not work
were the heterogeneity of R&D-projects and the absence of perfect
information. The cash could only be put out by persons with suf-
ﬁcient knowledge of the technology and organisation of a project
at hand and this knowledge was not generally tradable. Entry and
exit in R&D-projects was  also complicated. Historically, scholars
have argued that ﬁrms are institutions that reduce transaction
costs (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985), mitigate bounded rational-
ity (Simon, 1997), solve the agency problem (Jensen and Meckling,
1976; Fama, 1980), provide an incentive system (Holmstrom and
Milgrom, 1994) or assign property rights efﬁciently (Hart, 1995).
In addition, ﬁrms could be seen as institutions that can effectively
allocate cash to R&D-projects, by combining it with knowledge and
monitoring systems.
An evolutionary positive feedback process in which surviving
organisations amassed ever larger cash ﬂows and better knowl-
edge was undoubtedly important for ﬁnancing R&D. A long time
was needed for such unique organisations to emerge and develop.
It only took a few months for a large ﬁrm to go bankrupt, but
many decades to rebuild the R&D-cash allocation function, includ-
ing the free cash ﬂow and knowledge, from scratch. This entropy
also implied that upon dissolution of a ﬁrm, information was  lost,
sometimes forever, that could not be fully traded or disclosed and
sometimes not even articulated. This raises intriguing dilemmas for
industry policy.
3.1. Long-run growth rates of R&D outlays
The aggregate effect of an evolutionary cash accumulation pro-
cess at work should be observable in the long-run pattern of R&D
expenditure relative to GDP. Before 1900 little evidence is available
on aggregate R&D expenditure, though our R&D-project case stud-
ies for Britain, below, suggest that it is unlikely that the real growth
rate of R&D-expenditure was lower than real GDP-growth between
the start of the Industrial Revolution and 1900.
From 1910 onwards, several estimates are available for R&D-
outlays in Britain. These are not derived directly from precisely
1798 G. Bakker / Research Policy 42 (2013) 1793– 1814
Table 3
Growth rates of real R&D-expenditure in Britain and the United States, c. 1910–2008.
Type Period Growth rate (%/yr) gR&D/gGDP Source
R&D-exp. GDP
UK
All R&D c. 1910–1938 4.7 1.0 4.7 Sanderson (1972a)
All R&D 1938–1945 18.2 2.4 7.7 Saul (1979)
All R&D 1945–1961 13.0 2.1 6.1 Saul (1979)
All R&D 1961–1969 3.3 3.0 1.1 Saul (1979)
All R&D 1964–1998 1.7 2.3 0.7 von Tunzelmann (2004)
Business R&D 1964–1998 1.8 2.3 0.7 von Tunzelmann (2004)
HE R&D 1964–1998 5.8 2.3 2.5 von Tunzelmann (2004)
US
Business scientists 1921–1940 12.9 2.9 4.4 Mowery and Rosenberg (1989)
Business R&D 1930–1940 1.7 0.5 3.5 Mowery and Rosenberg (1989)
All R&D 1941–1963 11.0 4.0 2.8 Mansﬁeld (1968)
All R&D 1953–2008 5.5 3.2 1.7 Nicholas (2011)
All R&D 1970–1999 3.4 3.2 1.0 von Tunzelmann (2004)
Notes: R&D refers to real R&D, deﬂated using the same deﬂators as for GDP, except for ’Business scientists’. GDP refers to real GDP deﬂated using Ofﬁcer’s (2011) and Johnston
and  Williamson’s (2011) GDP-deﬂators. gR&D/gGDP refers to the R&D growth rate over the GDP growth rate. A value of 4.7, for example means that R&D-expenditure grew
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and Williamson (2010) introduce the Empire State Building in New
York, completed in 1931, as a good historical costing example of
a non-R&D project. We  therefore use its construction costs as a.7  times as fast as GDP. ’Business scientists’ refers to the growth rate of scientists em
rowth, as that data is not available. HE R&D refers to R&D by higher education inst
ecorded ﬁgures in national accounts or censuses of industry,
ut are best estimates based on surrogate indicators. Given the
ata quality, we focus here on the growth rates of R&D outlays,
hich may  be more reliable, informative and comparable, and less
ependent on the particular measurement concept used, than abso-
ute outlays. It is clear that British R&D outlays grew rapidly—almost
ve times as fast as GDP—in the three decades since 1910, then
lmost eight times as fast during the war, and then six times as fast
n the immediate post-war period (Table 3).
The high multiples between the 1900s and the 1960s, of ﬁve to
ight times GDP-growth, show that the economy managed to allo-
ate ever more cash to R&D-projects with a long-run pay-off. More
nd more resources were taken out of direct production and put
nto long-term roundabout production. The economy developed
nd used a variety of institutions that enabled ever more cash to
e sunk in R&D-projects. We  will discuss these institutions in the
ext section.
During the 1960s, the growth of R&D outlays slowed down to
bout the same rate as GDP-growth, and after that both aggre-
ate and private R&D grew substantially slower than GDP, while
&D in higher education increased with several times the rate of
DP-growth. These growth rates suggest an inverted U-shape of
elative R&D-growth, with R&D growth reaching a peak during the
ar and slowing down subsequently. The period since the 1970s,
ay  have been unique, because for the ﬁrst time since the Indus-
rial Revolution, the growth of R&D-outlays has no longer exceeded
DP-growth.
For the United States, we cannot reject a similar long-run pat-
ern of R&D outlays. Although reliable estimates are missing for
he period before the 1930s, the growth rate of scientists employed
n corporate R&D labs suggests that R&D-outlays grew about four
imes faster as GDP-growth, a ﬁgure not out of line with the growth
f private R&D outlays in the 1930s, and the British relative R&D-
rowth multiples. The estimates suggest that after the war, the
elative growth rate slowed down, and that from the 1970s, aggre-
ate U.S. R&D was growing about as fast as the economy.
These data show the enormous scale at which cash historically
as been allocated to R&D-projects in spite of the major obstacles
e noted. R&D outlays that grew faster than GDP also showed thencreasing opportunity costs of aggregate R&D: society was  willing
o give up an increasing share of its current income to sink into
&D-projects with an uncertain outcome at an indeﬁnite moment
n the future.d in corporate R&D labs and is uses for 1921–1940 instead of real R&D-expenditure
ns.
3.2. Historical case studies of outlays on particular R&D  projects
We  also have collected historical case studies of particular R&D
projects. Case studies are important in historical approaches to
innovation, and in doing these we  follow work done by, for exam-
ple, Alfred Chandler, Douglass North and Oliver Williamson (see
also the Introduction). In our case studies, unlike many other papers
on R&D ﬁnance, the particular R&D-project is the unit of analysis,
rather than other units such as ﬁrm R&D outlays, R&D-sales ratios,
patents, etc.11
The collection of cases we have assembled is simply that, a col-
lection of case studies. We do not claim that they are in any way
necessarily representative, and this is difﬁcult in R&D-projects any-
way, as each R&D-project by deﬁnition was unique. We  should also
note that the cost data should be seen as broad estimates and may
not be precisely comparable. Total project costs have been taken
from the source. For many amounts it is unclear to what extent
development and pilot production have been included. For some
amounts, such as the spinning jenny, it is known that they are for
the innovation only, for others more costs were included. In the case
of the water frame, for example, the building of two  pilot plants are
included in direct costs, making it one of the most costly private
innovations of its time. The costs in the table should therefore be
read only as rough indications of the magnitude of expenditures.
The costs collected are total costs of the R&D-project in nominal
pounds or dollars of the time. These costs are then converted into
real amounts that are comparable over time using three different
approaches. First, we  correct them for price rises of all goods and
services by converting the nominal amounts into constant pounds
or dollars using the GDP-deﬂator, based on the middle year of the
R&D-project’s duration (Ofﬁcer and Williamson, 2010).
Because the resulting real amounts are not always intuitively
easy to interpret and compare, we have developed a second way to
express project costs, which we  call the Empire State Index. Ofﬁcer11 For a discussion of expenditure per ﬁrm and historical British R&D expenditure
in general see Sanderson (1972a), Saul (1979), and Edgerton and Horrocks (1994).
For  a historical introduction on the US situation see Mowery and Rosenberg (1989),
and Lamoreaux and Sokoloff (2007).
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Fig. 1. Real costs of selected historical cases of completed R&D-projects, Britain and the United States, 1700–2000, Empire State Index; semi-logarithmic scale. Notes: ‘Britain’
refers to the British cases from Table 4; the other labels refer to the respective categories of the U.S. cases in Table 5. The Empire State Index divides the real GDP-deﬂated
R&D-costs by the construction costs of the Empire State Building (1931).
Sources: Tables 4 and 5.
0.000 001
0.00001
0.00 01
0.001
0.01
0.1
1
10
1700 1725 1750 1775 1800 1825 1850 18 75 19 00 192 5 195 0 197 5 200 0
P
ro
je
c
t 
c
o
s
ts
 a
s
 p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 o
f 
G
D
P
F  the U
S
h
u
o
a
a
o
U
b
t
S
s
c
oig. 2. Real costs of selected historical cases of completed R&D-projects, Britain and
ources: Tables 4 and 5.
istorical comparator. These costs may  be intuitively more readily
nderstood than the more ‘abstract’ costs of R&D-projects. The scale
f the Manhattan project, for example, becomes immediately clear,
s it amounted to about forty Empire State buildings, making it
rguably equal to much of the construction value of real estate
n Manhattan. To facilitate comparisons between Britain and the
nited States, the Empire State Building construction costs have
een expressed in British pounds using the 1931 exchange rate, so
hat we also can express the value of British R&D-projects in Empire
tate Buildings.A third method of comparing R&D costs is using their GDP-
hare. On the demand side, the GDP-share shows the opportunity
osts to society; it reﬂects what share of income the econ-
my  needed to give up for the project (Ofﬁcer and Williamson,nited States, 1700–2000, GDP-share; semi-logarithmic scale. Notes: see Fig. 1.
2010). On the supply side, this measure ‘corrects’ the costs
for national market size—it expresses costs in relation to this
market size, assuming that the higher the share, the more difﬁcult
to extract the ﬁnance and resources from the production process.
This might be a useful heuristic tool as it links R&D costs to the
capacity of a growing market to generate income that can be
sunk into R&D projects. However, it is innocent of the fact that as
market size grows, the R&D-costs for a given quality level remain
the same, and for this purpose the GDP-deﬂator might be better.
Table 4 shows selected historical cases of mostly successful
British innovations for which cost data have been located. Project
costs and time lags varied substantially between projects. Most
innovations included were product innovations, though chemical
innovations often were both product and process innovations, since
1800
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Table 4
Selected cases of completed R&D-projects and their direct costs and mode of ﬁnancing, Britain 1736–1957.
Year Innovator Innovation Direct cost Time lag Category
GDP-deﬂated Opportunity costs Empire State Index
(£  of 2005) (% of GDP) (£m 2005) (ESI) (Magnitude) (years)
1736 Harrison Ship’s clock 1,762,824 0.01730 217 0.0041 2 −20 Prize by Board of Longitude
1767  Hargreaves Spinning jenny 134,824 0.00117 15 0.0003 1 3.5 Angel-rel. ind.
1768  Richard Arkwright Waterframe 1,229,302 0.01021 128 0.0029 2 6 Angel-family; then projectors/VC
1823  Charles Babbage Difference Engine 1,550,312 0.00375 47 0.0036 2 20 Government contract
1825  Roberts/Sharp Self-acting mule 1,027,103 0.00248 31 0.0024 2 4 Self-ﬁnancing; cash ﬂow
1883  Priestman Brothers Oil engine 4,233,365 0.00313 39 0.0098 2 11 Cash ﬂow
1885  Cuthbert Heath New insurance policies 700,000 0.00057 7 0.0016 2 3 Angel-family
1903  Napier Car engine plant 2,990,826 0.00167 21 0.0069 2 3 Angel-family; angel-rel. ind.
1904  Lever Brothers Soap mass manufacturing 2,432,432 0.00133 17 0.0056 2 2 Angel-unspeciﬁed; cash ﬂow
1904  Courtaulds Artiﬁcial silk 17,117,117 0.00934 117 0.0397 3 4 IPO; cash ﬂow; divestments
1909  Louis Bleriot Crossing Channel by plane 90,090 0.00005 1 0.0002 1 −0.5 Prize by Daily Mail newspaper
1919  Alcock/Brown Transatlantic ﬂight <72 h 381,679 0.00018 2 0.0009 1 −6 Prize by Daily Mail newspaper
1924  Vickers/Air Ministry Airship programme 18,636,364 0.00891 112 0.0432 3 6 Govt. contract; direct govt. R&D
1941  ICI Nuclear research 56,100,000 0.01707 214 0.1302 4 3 Government contract
1941  Calico Printers/ICI Terylene 99,255,583 0.03340 419 0.2303 4 9 Cash ﬂow
1952  Pilkington Float-glass process 74,766,355 0.02053 257 0.1735 4 6 Cash ﬂow
1957  Beecham Semi-synthetic antibiotics 148,367,953 0.03483 437 0.3442 4 9 Cash ﬂow
Source: Allen (2009), Edgerton (1987), Edgerton and Horrocks (1994), Kealey (1996), Michie (1981, 1988), and Saul (1979).
Notes: Year is the year that the R&D started, except for prizes, which show the year the prize was  awarded. 1885, 1903 and 1904 are estimates based on the historical literature. Costs are direct historical cash outlays on R&D as
documented in the sources and have not been discounted into one net present value using the time lags. Real direct costs have been calculated using the UK  GDP-deﬂator from Ofﬁcer (2011) for the mid-year in the project lifespan.
Opportunity costs in £m are as percentage of 2005 GDP. Please note that costs are not precisely comparable. Sometimes development is included, sometimes not, and sometimes building of pilot plants is included, such as in the
case  of the waterframe and soap. Costs in this table should only be used to get an idea of the order of magnitude of R&D-expenditures, in the absence of systematic long-run project data, and not as exact and fully comparable
ﬁgures.  For the spinning jenny, Allen’s (2009) estimate of direct costs has been doubled to account for Hargreaves’ opportunity costs and board and lodging received. The time lag has been estimated from the sources and should
be  taken as a ball park indication, especially for the 1885, 1903 and 1904 cases. For the airship programme and the nuclear research the time lag is simply the length of the research programme. For the ship’s clock Harrison’s ﬁrst
successful  test has been taken as year, as he received numerous different payments, the ﬁrst being close to that year. Angel-rel. ind.: an angel investor from an industry related to the innovator’s industry. VC: Venture capital.
Govt.:  Government. Empire State Index (ESI): expresses the projects costs as fraction of the GDP-deﬂated construction costs of the Empire State Building (1931) in New York (see text). Magnitude: shows the order of magnitude of
the  Empire State Index, with 1 being the lowest observed order, which is between 1/10,000 and 1/1000 of the Empire State Building, and 7 being the highest observed order, which is between 100 and 1000 Empire State Buildings.
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Table 5
Selected cases of completed R&D-projects and their direct costs and mode of ﬁnancing, United States, 1875–1999.
Year Innovator Innovation Direct cost Time lag Category
GDP-deﬂated Opportunity costs Empire state Index
($ of 2005) (% of GDP) ($m 2005) (ESI) (Magnitude) (years)
Chemicals
1895 Brush/Carl von Linde Liquefying air 4,863,813 0.00104 131 0.0109 3 10 Self-ﬁnancing/cash ﬂow
1924  DuPont US rights to Claude process 26,641,294 0.00322 406 0.0595 3 1 Cash ﬂow; patent collateral
1924  DuPont Moisture-proof cellophane 369,159 0.00004 6 0.0008 1 3 Cash ﬂow
1939  DuPont Cellophane process improvements 165,162,455 0.00821 1036 0.3690 4 11 Cash ﬂow
1946  DuPont Titanium 61,475,410 0.00306 387 0.1374 4 7 Cash ﬂow
1948  DuPont Dacron 40,701,315 0.00181 229 0.0909 3 8 Cash ﬂow
Oil/catalytic  cracking
1909 Standard Oil of Indiana Catalytic cracking 1,476,726 0.00027 34 0.0033 2 4 Cash ﬂow
1917  Universal Oil Products Flow cracking process 53,191,489 0.00766 967 0.1188 4 5 Angel-rel.; cash ﬂow unrel. ﬁrm
1918  Oil ﬁrm Tube and tank cracking process 5,479,452 0.00082 103 0.0122 3 5 Unknown
1925  Houdry Process Corporation Houdry catalytic cracking 135,970,334 0.01873 2365 0.3038 4 12 Self-ﬁnance; cash ﬂow rel. ﬁrms
1929  Standard Oil of New Jersey Purchase IG Farben patent portfolio 329,877,474 0.03376 4262 0.7370 4 0 Cash ﬂow; patent collateral
1935  Houdry Process Corporation TCC/Houdriﬂow process 13,387,660 0.00125 158 0.0299 3 8 Cash ﬂow
1938  Consortium of six oil ﬁrms Fluid catalytic cracking process 172,612,198 0.01479 1867 0.3856 4 3 Cash ﬂow
Aircraft
1927  Lockheed First streamlined aircraft 238,322 0.00003 3 0.0005 1 1 Cash ﬂow
1932  Douglas DC-1/DC-2 5,804,041 0.00081 102 0.0130 3 2 Cash ﬂow
1936  Douglas DC-3 3,537,736 0.00041 52 0.0079 2 1 Cash ﬂow
1952  Douglas DC-8 652,680,653 0.02560 3231 1.4582 5 6 Cash ﬂow; government subsidy
1952  Boeing B707 186,480,186 0.00731 923 0.4166 4 6 Cash ﬂow; joint with military version
1959  Douglas Electra turboprop plane 408,942,203 0.01480 1869 0.9136 4 1 Cash ﬂow
1964  Boeing Boeing 747 3,662,109,375 0.09524 12,022 8.1817 5 4 Cash ﬂow
1982  Hypothetical (est. by Boeing) “Large commercial jet” 8,121,277,748 0.13833 17,462 18.1441 6 7 —
Other  innovations
1875 Unknown Mechanical substitute for horses 180,505 0.00012 15 0.0004 1 −3 Prize by Wisconsin legislature
1880  Alexander E. Brown Hoisting machine 1,851,852 0.00097 122 0.0041 2 2 Angel-family
1895  J. Frank Duryea Self-propelling road carriages 108,696 0.00003 4 0.0002 1 −0.3 Prize by Chicago Herald Tribune
1908  Glenn Curtiss Fly a plane for 1 km 40,850 0.00001 1 0.0001 0 −0.3 Prize
1912  A Canadian company Acq. S.A. Baker’s car heater patent 2,469,136 0.00043 54 0.0055 2 0 Cash ﬂow; patent collateral
1920  Westinghouse Electric Acq. radio patents from E. Armstrong 2,723,735 0.00040 50 0.0061 2 0 Cash ﬂow; patent collateral; univ.
1930  RCA Television 73,702,830 0.00852 1076 0.1647 4 9 Cash ﬂow
1931  Comparative non-R&D example Empire State Building 447,598,253 0.05361 6767 1.0000 5 1 Bank ﬁnancing
1941  US Government Manhattan project R&D 648,148,148 0.03185 4020 1.4481 5 4 Direct government spending
1942  US Government Manhattan project pilot plants 17,870,370,370 0.87806 110,838 39.9250 6 3 Direct government spending
1961  NASA Manned moonlanding 170,000,000,000 4.42098 558,060 379.8049 7 8 US Government
1961  NASA Apollo launch vehicle engine devpt. 4367,075,665 0.12873 16,250 9.7567 5 5 US Government
1972  Cray Research Supercomputer 28,007,175 0.00057 72 0.0626 3 4 Venture capital; founders
1976  Genentech Genetic sequencing technology 115,233,090 0.00197 248 0.2575 4 5 Venture capital; founders
1977  Apple Computer Home computer 9,357,861 0.00016 20 0.0209 3 4 Venture capital; founders
1979  Seagate Disc drives 2,431,414 0.00004 5 0.0054 2 2 Venture capital; founders
1982  Lotus Development Spreadsheet software 8,604,945 0.00015 19 0.0192 3 1.5 Venture capital; founders
1982  Genentech H. growth hormone / gamma interferon 83,654,007 0.00127 161 0.1869 4 5 RDFO funding (excubation of ﬁnance)
1983  Ovation Technologies Spreadsheet software 10,416,667 0.00017 21 0.0233 3 1 Venture capital; founders
1987  Multi-ﬁrm R&D consortium New microchips 138,504,155 0.00172 218 0.3094 4 7 Government contract
1996  Burt Rutan Privately-built spacecraft 10,332,713 0.00008 11 0.0231 3 −8 Prize; angel-unrel. ind. (Paul Allen)
1999  Google Improved search technology 57,623,603 0.00053 67 0.1287 4 4 Venture capital; founders
Sources: Beatty et al. (1995), Congressional Budget Ofﬁce (2004), Edgerton (2006), Enos (1962), Freeman and Soete (1997), Fried and Ganor (2006), Kealey (1996), Knowledge Ecology International (2008), Mueller (1962),
Lamoreaux et al. (2007), Nicholas (2010), Sahlman (1990), Saul (1979), and Sutton (1998).
Notes: Year is the year that the R&D started, except for prizes, which show the year the prize was awarded. For some cases estimates had to be made based on the historical literature. Costs are direct historical cash outlays on R&D
as  documented in the sources and have not been discounted into one net present value using the time lags. Real direct costs have been calculated using the US  GDP-deﬂator from Johnston and Williamson (2011) for the mid-year
in  the project lifespan. Opportunity costs in $m are as percentage of 2005 GDP. The costs are not precisely comparable; see the note under Table 4. For the cases of Cray Research, Apple Computer, Seagate and Lotus Development,
the  costs are the pre-IPO invested cash by founders and venture capitalists. The time lag has been estimated from the sources and should be taken as a ball park indication. Aircraft R&D-costs are very rough indicative costs, as
civilian  R&D was  not always separable from military R&D (the Boeing 707 R&D was partially done for a military tanker version, for example), and because development expenditures were probably included to a different degree
in  different cases. Angel-rel. ind., an angel investor from an industry related to the innovator’s industry. Univ.: University. Empire State Index (ESI): expresses the projects costs as fraction of the GDP-deﬂated construction costs
of  the Empire State Building (1931) in New York (see text). Magnitude: shows the order of magnitude on the Empire State Index, with 1 being the lowest observed order, which is between 1/10,000 and 1/1000 Empire State
Building, and 7 being the highest observed order, which is between 100 and 1000 Empire State Buildings.
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ources: Tables 4 and 5.
eveloping a viable manufacturing process was often as difﬁcult as
eveloping a compound itself. For the cases presented, cash ﬂow
nancing was not that important until the late nineteenth century
These anecdotal ﬁgures suggest that the sharp growth in R&D
xpenditure may  not be something characteristic solely of the
wentieth century, but may  already have started during the Indus-
rial Revolution. For the development cost associated with artiﬁcial
ilk, for example, a hundred Hargreaveses could have developed the
pinning jenny. If this difference was at all representative, it would
oint to a growth in real outlays on a major innovation of 3.6 per-
ent per year between 1767 and 1904, compared to a GDP-growth
f 2.0 percent.
Likewise, for the cost of ICI’s war-time nuclear research, one
ould pay 26 Charles Babbages to develop a difference engine. If
t all representative, this comparison points to a growth rate of
eal outlays on major government R&D-contracts of 2.8 percent
nnually between 1823 and 1941 compared to a GDP-growth of
.0 percent.
Expressing costs as share of GDP shows project-sizes ﬂuctuating
etween four orders of magnitude, from £1m for the ﬁrst channel-
rossing by plane to £437m for the development of semi-synthetic
ntibiotics. This range is probably not fully representative; the
nclusion of cases from the aircraft industry and large government-
unded projects would surely increase the range upwards. Yet it
oes help us to put historical project costs into perspective. The
oard of Longitude’s ship’s clock project, for example, which cost
217m, had the scale of a twentieth century war time govern-
ent research project, being about as large as ICI’s nuclear research
rogramme. Given that over the eighteenth century the Board of
ongitude paid over seven times Harrison’s amount in total for all
inds of innovations that helped establish longitude, total costs
ere much higher, around £1.5bn—about seven times ICI’s war
ime nuclear R&D.
For the United States R&D-projects for which cost ﬁgures were
eported have also been located (Table 5). As with the British
ases, costs are probably not exactly comparable and should be
een as broad estimates. Besides varying costs, the nature of R&D
rojects also diverged considerably, as can be seen from the table.
n catalytic cracking and aircraft R&D a ‘low-hanging fruit’ patterne lags, Britain and the United States, 1700–2000, Empire State Index and years;
is visible, with low initial but rapidly escalating R&D-costs (Enos,
1962). Trajectories seem to have followed the colloquial saying
that R&D-costs must rise exponentially for a linear increase in
innovation.
Cash ﬂow was  the dominant way  of ﬁnancing for the case studies
surveyed. R&D-projects earlier than the cases in Table 5 probably
used a greater variety of ﬁnancing methods, as in the British case.
Standard Oil of New Jersey’s purchase of IG Farben’s non-German
patent rights was the largest pre-war project among the cases. A
major advantage was, of course, that the technology had already
been developed, meaning that there were fewer sunk costs (as the
patents could be sold on), little uncertainty and hardly any time lag,
adverse selection or moral hazard. In theory, it was also possible
to use the portfolio as collateral, making ﬁnancing easier. Though
one could probably not group the purchase of a patent-portfolio
under R&D, it did resolve most of the obstacles to ﬁnancing R&D.
Disadvantages were probably the high price paid, the considerable
knowledge and development costs needed to use the patents, and
the fact that somebody had to have already completed the neces-
sary R&D.
Costs of R&D-projects could differ enormously, sometimes by
several orders of magnitude. The R&D for cellophane or for Lock-
heed’s Vega streamlined aircraft was  only a few million dollars,
measured in GDP-share, while the development of television cost
over $1bn, the Manhattan Project R&D over $4bn, its pilot plants
$111bn, and the manned moon landing $558bn. The Boeing 747
cost over $12bn to develop, four thousand times more than the
Lockheed Vega forty years earlier, and even more if we  used GDP-
deﬂated costs. These cases show the enormous scale at which ﬁrms
burnt cash on R&D-projects, in spite of the major ﬁnancing obsta-
cles.
The cases since the 1970s that were ﬁnanced with venture cap-
ital show that the pre-IPO amounts sunk into these projects were
not extremely big compared to R&D projects earlier in the century,
or even in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Key differences
were that the venture capital-backed projects often developed dis-
coveries made in the sharply growing government and university
labs and that the projects did not yet have positive cash ﬂow before
IPO; the IPO itself was  a way to get more cash to get the project
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Table 6
Estimates of R&D elasticity and investment elasticity to cash ﬂow from selected studies, 1974–2006.
Country Period Industry Measured parameter Elasticity Source
US 1980–2001 Pharmaceuticals Drug-price elasticity of R&D 0.6 Giacotto, Santerre and Vernon (2005)
Italy  1998–2003 Small Italian mfg. ﬁrms Cash ﬂow elasticity of R&D Strongly positive Ughetto (2008)
US  1983–1987 179 ﬁrms in high-tech industries Cash ﬂow elasticity of R&D 0.67 Himmelberg and Petersen (1994)
US  1983–1987 179 ﬁrms in high-tech industries Cash ﬂow elasticity phys. I. 0.82 Himmelberg and Petersen (1994)
US  1974–1994 Pharmaceuticals Cash ﬂow elasticity of R&D 0.22 Vernon (2004)
US  1974–1994 11 major drug ﬁrms Cash ﬂow elasticity of R&D Strongly positive Grabowski and Vernon (2000)
US  1970–2006 High tech ﬁrms Cash ﬂow elasticity of R&D “Comparatively strong” Brown and Petersen (2009)
US  1970–2006 High tech ﬁrms Cash ﬂow elasticity phys. I. “Largely disappears” Brown and Petersen (2009)
US  1990–2004 Young high-tech ﬁrms Cash ﬂow elasticity of R&D “Signiﬁcant effects” Brown, Fazzari and Petersen (2009)
US  1990–2004 Mature high-tech ﬁrms Cash ﬂow elasticity of R&D Insigniﬁcant Brown, Fazzari and Petersen (2009)
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oing. It shows how the IPO could be a device to increase project-
cale by requiring in the pre-IPO stage funding at a similar order of
agnitude that had been used before for other R&D projects.
The cost of the cases in both countries from Tables 4 and 5 are
xpressed in the Empire State Index (ESI), GDP-share and plotted
gainst their time lag in Figs. 1–3. The cases varied greatly in size,
ime lag and character. We  should not forget that these were par-
icular, unique R&D projects that in many dimensions were widely
ivergent. In addition, over the entire period between the ﬁrst cases
nd the present, the size of the market increased enormously: in
ritain between 1736 and 2010 by more than two  orders of magni-
ude, 135 times, and in the United States between 1790 and 2010 by
ore than three orders of magnitude, or about 3250 times (Ofﬁcer
nd Williamson, 2010).
From Fig. 1 the large variation in project costs is immedi-
tely clear. Even if we cannot be extremely precise given the data
uality, we can infer that the real costs of these R&D-projects
panned at least seven orders of magnitude, from 1/10,000 of the
mpire State Building construction costs to 1000 ESI, the largest
roject—the Apollo project of the 1960s in this case—being one to
en million times the size of the smallest project—J. Frank Duryea’s
elf-propelling road carriage from 1895. In few other areas in man-
gement and economics do we ﬁnd such gigantic differences in
cale, and Fig. 1 gives us a rare opportunity to quantify this degree of
ariation between the cases we studied. It is clear that R&D projects
etween c. 1750 and 2000 had at least this variation, and new cases
an only extend the range, not reduce it.
It is also clear that eighteenth and early nineteenth century
ritain was able to incur R&D-projects of substantial scale—the
hip’s clock, water frame, difference engine or self-acting mule hav-
ng real GDP-deﬂated R&D costs that were of magnitude 2 (in the
ange of 0.001 ESI), similar to the R&D costs of car engines or soap in
arly twentieth century Britain, and to those of the DC-3, or the ﬁrst
atalytic cracking process in the United States. These early British
ases, even though they are only a handful, reject the notion that
re-twentieth century society was unable to incur large-scale R&D
rojects.
Using our second measure, expressing R&D-costs as GDP-share
Fig. 2) rather than using the GDP-deﬂated ESI index, increases the
elative importance of the early British cases. Compared to the size
f the economy, the development of the ship’s clock was a truly
igantic project, of an order of magnitude comparable to the R&D
osts of the Manhattan project, the Houdry or ﬂuid catalytic pro-
esses, or the development of the DC-8. One thus could say that
he ship’s clock was the eighteenth century’s Manhattan project.
he water frame came close to this scale as well. The spinning
enny, with far more modest development costs, was  comparable to
he development of the hoisting machine in 1880, the Linde lique-
ed air process of 1895, the tube tank catalytic cracking process of
918, the DC-1/DC-2 of 1932 or the development and testing ofrecombinant growth hormone in 1982. The Babbage difference
engine and the self-acting mule of the 1820s were comparable, as
share of GDP, to DuPont’s purchase of the Claude process in 1924,
the development of titanium in 1946, that of Dacron in 1948, and
Apple Computer’s pre-IPO costs in the late 1970s. It is also clear
from Fig. 1 that until at least the 1950s, British ﬁrms were able to
carry out large scale research projects that were broadly similar in
size to many large U.S. R&D projects.
Looking at the time lags (Fig. 3) it is clear that few positive time
lags were larger than ten years, and few negative time lags (for
prizes or patent purchases or R&D-in-process purchases) shorter
than minus ten years. Of the positive time lag projects, very few
projects had a long time lag and low costs. Of the negative time
lag projects, very few had a long negative time lag, and very few
had very high costs. Most cases were within two adjacent areas:
between zero and ﬁve years in the range of 1/1000 to 1 ESI, or
between ﬁve and ten years in the range of 1/100 to 1 ESI. It is also
clear that the most costly projects did not have the longest duration.
Babbage’s difference engine seems to be an outlier with twenty
years of development. It is also clear that the Manhattan project
and the Apollo project were the biggest cases of their time. In Fig. 3,
obviously lower and higher bounds can be drawn in which we ﬁnd
most of the cases.
3.3. The sensitivity of R&D outlays to cash ﬂow
It is clear from the above that ﬁrms needed cash to carry out
R&D: with very limited possibilities for collateral, real uncertainty,
long multi-stage time lags, and information asymmetries, the mar-
ket for the ﬁnancing of R&D-projects was  highly imperfect. This
is not unrelated to the pecking order theory of corporate ﬁnance
introduced by Myers and Majluf (1984), who  argue that because
of adverse selection, ﬁnancers will demand higher returns on cer-
tain kinds of projects. External ﬁnance will thus be more expensive
on these projects and a pecking order will emerge that effectively
ranks ﬁnancing alternatives in an order descending in the degree
to which they enable managers to exploit investment opportuni-
ties: internal funds, then high-priority debt, lower priority debt,
and ﬁnally equity (see also Triantis, 2000). R&D appears to be an
extreme case because of the severe information asymmetries, the
absence of collateral, the time lag and uncertainty.
This perspective is corroborated by present-day empirical evi-
dence on the sensitivity of R&D-outlays to ﬁrms’ cash ﬂow. If cash
and ﬁnancing constraints are important we would expect that R&D
outlays are very sensitive to cash ﬂow. If this were not the case, we
could reject our hypothesis.
Although studies vary, they generally ﬁnd that R&D-outlays are
far more sensitive to changes in cash ﬂow for smaller enterprises
than for large enterprises (Table 6) (Himmelberg and Petersen,
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1750 
1750-1850   1850-1900   1900-1930  1930-1950  1950-1980  1980-2010  
Private 
Individual self-fi nancing  
Angel investors  
Cash- flow from exis ting operatio ns 
Stock ma rket  
Mergers & acqu isitions 
Multinational en terpris e 
Ven ture capi tal 
Semi-
public  Univer sities
Independent re search laborat ories 
Industry associa tion labora torie s 
Public 
Use of government R&D 
Monopoly grants 
Gove rnment  R&D cont racts  
Legal-
institu-
tional 
Property rights per se 
Prizes 
Intellectual property rights 
Knowledge  sharing 
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iig. 4. Historical emergence of institutional solutions to the R&D-ﬁnancing problem
he  solution became widely adopted for the ﬁnancing of R&D, not to the period wh
ee  text.
994; Ughetto, 2008).12 Estimates for the cash-ﬂow elasticity of
&D vary from 0.4 to 0.8 between several studies, suggesting that a
ne percent increase in free cash ﬂow would lead roughly speaking
o a 0.6 percent increase in R&D (Bloch, 2005; Hall, 2002).
12 Mulkay et al. (2001), using cash ﬂow net of R&D outlays but gross of ordi-
ary investment for large U.S. and French manufacturing ﬁrms between 1979 and
993, ﬁnd little difference between the sensitivity of their R&D and their ordinary
nvestments to cash ﬂow net of R&D outlays.e: this is an informal and broad periodisation. The period refers to the period when
 underlying organisational form or institutional instrument ﬁrst appeared. Source:
Brown and Petersen (2009) show that since 1970 the cash-
ﬂow elasticity of physical investment has declined sharply, perhaps
because of better functioning capital markets, while the cash-
ﬂow elasticity of R&D outlays has remained. Vernon (2004) ﬁnds
that after controlling for endogeneity large pharmaceutical ﬁrms’
R&D was  still sensitive to cash ﬂow, but that the sensitivity, 0.22,
was lower than values from other studies (see also Grabowski
and Vernon, 2000; Schroth and Szalay, 2010). Brown et al. (2009)
even ﬁnd that the 1990s R&D boom, mainly in internet-related
technologies, can be largely explained by ﬁnance supply shifts that
increased the cash available to young ﬁrms.
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Despite the varying ﬁndings and the measurement difﬁculties
ll this evidence points to the notion that ﬁrms needed cash, not
apital to ﬁnance R&D-projects. Despite the ﬁve obstacles to obtain-
ng research ﬁnance, they were generally able to ﬁnance projects.
n the next section we are going to review some organisational
orms and institutional instruments that ﬁrms used to ﬁnance
&D.
. The institutional evolution of the allocation of cash for
&D
From the historical evidence above it is clear that aggregate
&D-outlays grew faster than GDP-growth for a long time, and that
articular R&D-projects involving large scale outlays have existed
t least since the mid-eighteenth century. Despite the ﬁnancing
bstacles, from early on ﬁrms were able to incur large amounts of
&D outlays for large and uncertain projects, resulting in a phe-
omenal growth of aggregate cash outlays on R&D.
This ﬁnding is not unrelated to other work on organisations and
nstitutions. Ostrom (1990), for example, ﬁnds that although clas-
ical economic theory predicts that common pool resources such
s ﬁshing grounds, commons or water supply will be depleted
ithout government intervention, communities developed many
ifferent ways to govern the common pool resources. In practice
ew were depleted.13 Likewise, Chandler’s historical masterwork
1962) showed convincingly that organisations did matter in eco-
omic processes. In Williamson’s (1981) words ‘after Chandler,
obody could argue anymore that organisations did not matter’.
illiamson (1985) shows how ﬁrms are able to solve transaction
roblems that would be problematic if carried out through a mar-
et.
Likewise, we note that in practice ﬁrms have been resourceful
nd creative in ﬁnding solutions to the R&D-ﬁnancing problem. We
ill argue that over time a series of cash allocation devices emerged
hat allowed ﬁrms to accumulate cash and sink it into R&D-projects.
n Fig. 4 the most important of these are shown in the period
hen they rose to dominance. These solutions enabled arbitrage
o take place in cash for R&D projects, through individuals, such as
ngel investors, through organisations, such as multinationals, and
hrough institutions, such as venture capital.
The cash allocation devices we discuss below can be divided
nto several different, overlapping ways. They can be divided into
evices depending on internal and those depending on external
nancing. They can be divided according to whether they can
rovide small-scale or large-scale ﬁnancing. They can be divided
ccording the stage in the R&D process they most easily ﬁnance:
arly stage or later stage R&D (Branscomb and Auerswald, 2001,
002). They can also be divided into whether they use free cash ﬂow
r not. And they can be divided into private, semi-public, public
nd legal-institutional devices. Given that the latter division most
losely relates to our research question, we will use it to guide our
iscussion, keeping the other comparative dimensions in mind, and
evisiting them in the comparative discussion at the end.We will discuss subsequently, in chronological order, the follow-
ng private institutions: individual self-ﬁnancing, angel investors,
ree cash ﬂow from existing operations, the stock market, merg-
rs and acquisitions, multinationals, venture capital, and R&D
13 In many respects R&D is the obverse of common pool resources (CPR): applied
&D is partially excludable and non-diminishable (nonrivalrous) while CPR are
on-excludable and non-diminishable. CPR also involve hardly any sunk costs,
ncertainty, time lags, adverse selection and moral hazard. CPR already exist while
&D-projects need to be realised. Solutions to CPR-problems focus on preventing
ver-use, while solutions to R&D-problems tend to prevent underinvestment. The
nancing of CPR-exploitation is relatively easy, that of R&D relatively hard.2 (2013) 1793– 1814 1805
ﬁnancing organisations; the following semi-public institutions:
universities, independent labs and industry association labs;
the following public institutions: government R&D, monopoly
grants and government R&D-contracts; and, ﬁnally, the following
legal-institutional instruments: property right, prizes, intellec-
tual property rights, and knowledge sharing. This series is not
exhaustive: we have restricted ourselves to the major institu-
tional solutions. Although they emerged gradually over time, the
R&D-ﬁnancing solutions were not mutually exclusive. In the late
twentieth century an R&D project, for example, could use different
devices to get cash for different stages of R&D. It could start, for
example, as a project in a university, followed by self-ﬁnancing by
individuals, followed by an angel investment, then venture capital,
an IPO and a merger. As normal as the staged use of these devises
may  seem today, with some R&D projects going through several of
them, they emerged historically, and to some extent in the order
that they are used today. By brieﬂy discussing these devices in suc-
cession, we aim to show how each addressed some aspect of the
R&D ﬁnancing problem, resulting in broad spectrum of ﬁnancing
options available today.
Many organisational solutions had several different purposes
and solved various different challenges simultaneously. We  are not
arguing that each of these devices had as main purpose the ﬁnan-
cing of R&D—some clearly had other important purposes, but we
do argue that many devices could be and were used for mitigating
the R&D-ﬁnancing problem.
4.1. Private institutions
The purest, simplest and probably oldest solution to the
R&D-ﬁnancing problem is obviously self-ﬁnancing by individuals.
Experimenting at one’s own  cost might even take place within ani-
mal  species. It solves the sunk costs and information asymmetry
obstacles, and given that there is no pressing need for proﬁts, the
cost of uncertainty and long time-lags are probably felt less. The
latter, of course, also might reduce the incentive to push for com-
mercial innovation. Many examples exist of gentleman-scientists
who made massive contributions to science rather than focus on
commercial application.
Charles Darwin and Henry Cavendish are well-known examples.
A post-war British exponent is Peter Mitchell who built his own
research lab at his country mansion and developed the chemios-
motic hypothesis, for which he won  the Nobel Prize (Kealey, 1996,
p. 75). Striking cases are also Edmund Cartwright who  funded the
development of the power loom from his own fortune, J.B. Lawes
who together with G.H. Gilbert invented superphosphate at his
Rothamsted farm lab in the 1820s, and Eugène Houdry who used
his family fortune to develop the Houdry catalytic cracking process
during the 1920s (Allen, 2009; Kealey, 1996; Freeman and Soete,
1997). The latter case also shows how self-ﬁnancing is limited by
the size of one’s fortune, as Houdry eventually had to form a joint-
venture with two  oil ﬁrms to pay for development costs.
Another cash allocation device was  the use of the angel investor,
an investor who  provided cash at a very early stage under ﬂexi-
ble conditions. The angel investor allowed the innovator to incur
sunk costs by providing cash. The time-lag became also less press-
ing because, contrary to bank loans, no regular interest payments
were required. Uncertainty remained. The angel investor did bear
all three problems of sunk costs, uncertainty and long time lags,
but by deﬁnition they were independently wealthy and could miss
the cash. Adverse selection and moral hazard remained, but gen-
erally angel investors mitigated this in three ways. Sometimes
they ﬁnanced family projects, where family ties decreased the
angel’s monitoring costs and increased the innovator’s cost of
opportunism. Sometimes they had made their fortune in related
industries so were knowledgeable about the innovator’s ﬁeld. Often
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hey operated in informal networks exchanging information and
onitoring jointly with other angels. Examples of the latter were
robably the Lunar Society during the Industrial Revolution, of
hich many leading industrialists were member. A late nine-
eenth century French example was a group of families around
yon that had made their fortune in silk and textiles and which
upported ﬁrms in new industries. By providing easy cash they
ankrolled Charles Pathé’s audacious entry into the phonograph
nd motion picture business, his company becoming the largest
lm producer–distributor in the world before 1914.
Sometimes entrepreneurs that made their fortune in one new
ndustry were happy to put cash in other new and uncertain
rojects, with the full knowledge they might not get it back. At
ther times entrepreneurs had a more direct interest in the project
hey backed, and were also likely to contribute knowledge and
ontacts. James Watt, for example, was initially backed by the
wner of a drowned mine that could not be saved with existing
umps. Likewise, Hargreaves’ development of the spinning jenny
as bankrolled by a textile industrialist, who paid him a wage,
oard and lodging and all the costs of the prototype and assistants.
his must have been a signiﬁcant amount, and at that time it was
ot at all clear that the venture would pay off. Hargreaves’ presence
n his backer’s estate helped mitigate moral hazard by allowing
ontinuous monitoring. A famous American angel investor was the
uthor Mark Twain, of St Louis, who was fascinated by technol-
gy and a close friend of Nikola Tesla. Twain almost bankrupted
imself by putting a sum of $190,000 (about $4m in 2005 dol-
ars, or $173m in GDP-share) in a failed type-setting machine. He
lso funded various other projects, such as the creation of one-
anded grape-shears, perpetual calendars and a cloth made from
eat (Lewis, 2011).
Taking cash ﬂow out of existing operations is a tried and tested
ethod to ﬁnance R&D. It differs from self-ﬁnancing by individ-
als in that existing operations deliver a cash ﬂow that can be
unk in R&D within the same business. The German chemical ﬁrms
f the later nineteenth century, for example, started to sink cash
ow from their dyestuff business into pharmaceutical laboratories
hich eventually grew into large and proﬁtable pharmaceutical
ivisions (Beer, 1958; Liebenau, 1988). Likewise, ICI, the British
hemical conglomerate, started sinking some cash ﬂow into a phar-
aceutical division from the mid-1930s. Only after twenty years
id it start to make some proﬁt, and only after thirty years did it
ecome very proﬁtable, with the introduction of several new types
f drugs such as corticosteroids and beta blockers (Owen, 1999).
owadays high technology ﬁrms such as Apple, Cisco, Google, Face-
ook and Amazon hold large cash piles in part to ﬁnance R&D and
he acquisition of patent portfolios and R&D-ﬁrms (see introduc-
ion, above).
With cash ﬂow ﬁnancing the monies are generally written off
mmediately, so that the ﬁnancing problems associated with sunk
osts, uncertainty and the time lag are mitigated, as no costs are
arried in the accounts that need to be written off if a project fails.
he funding method assumes, of course, a cash ﬂow that is large
nd long-lasting enough to sustain R&D projects. Studies showing
he present-day sensitivity of R&D outlays to cash ﬂows have been
iscussed above.
The adoption of modern incorporation laws during the nine-
eenth century (Harris, 2000) constituted a step change in the
ash allocation possibilities for R&D. The corporation mitigated
unk costs because they were shared by many investors, because
ispersed shareholders could diversify, because shares were trans-
erable so shareholders were not tied to the R&D-project for
ts duration, and, ﬁnally, because limited liability shareholders
ere less concerned about uncertain high-sunk cost projects
ith a small but not insigniﬁcant likelihood to bankrupt the
rm.2 (2013) 1793– 1814
The corporation mitigated the problems caused by time lags,
ﬁrst, by offering transferable shares, second, by keeping cash
locked-in because it did not face the potential call on its assets that
partnerships faced upon exit of a partner, and, third, by the fact that
corporations could survive beyond the life of its managers, owners
and employees.
Adverse selection and moral hazard were alleviated by doing
research in-house and setting up in-house R&D-labs. Schumpeter
(1942, p. 96) noted that “the ﬁrst thing a modern concern does as
soon as it feels that it can afford it is to establish a research depart-
ment.” The latter was not only important for generating inventions,
but also for being able to ﬁnd, screen and buy outside inventions,
to be able to prepare the acquisition of other companies, and to
generally assist in anticipating future industry development
(Simon, 1993; Nicholas, 2010).
Finally, corporations’ delegated control allowed for the gover-
nance of free cash ﬂow, so that it stayed inside the corporation
and could be used for things such as R&D, rather than be claimed
by shareholders. Kamien and Schwartz (1982, p. 28) suggest that
if stockholders accept normal stock returns on the presumption
that management has superior knowledge, extraordinary proﬁts
will allow ﬁrms to ﬁnance R&D in an uninhibited, ﬂexible manner.
Some studies, however, ﬁnd shareholders myopic, showing how
share prices generally fall when R&D-outlays rise, even if in the
past such increases led to high returns. Goodacre and Tonks (1995,
pp. 317–318), for example, ﬁnd a negative effect of R&D-outlays on
share prices, using a complete data-set based on forced disclosure
and thus preventing sample selection bias for the public announce-
ment of ‘good’ R&D-projects. They also note the myopic incentive of
managers to cut R&D-expenditure, as it will immediately increase
proﬁts. Likewise, Munari et al. (2010) ﬁnd a greater pressure
towards the reduction of R&D in market-based governance sys-
tems such as in Britain and the United States (see also O’Sullivan,
2000; Tylecote and Ramirez, 2006). Other studies, however, do not
ﬁnd a negative effect of corporate governance on R&D spending,
making the evidence mixed. Meulbroek et al. (1990), for example,
ﬁnd that U.S.’ ﬁrms R&D/sales ratios decline after implementing
takeover defences, and Hall and Hall (1993) do not ﬁnd evidence of
shareholders myopia towards R&D (see also Hall, 1994). The various
studies might highlight different sides of the same coin, especially
since corporate governance is hard to measure unambiguously.
Triantis (2000), for example, argues that, partially because of the
pecking order of ﬁnancing alternatives, too little ﬁnancial slack pre-
vents the ﬁrm from exploiting proﬁtable investment opportunities,
while too much slack encourages managerial misbehaviour and
exacerbates agency problems. Christensen (2008) explains how
over-use of ﬁnancial tools leads to underspending on R&D, for
example by erroneously comparing projects against a status quo
that will persist in the absence of R&D.
The nineteenth German chemical ﬁrms did not actually make
a return on investment calculation when founding research labs
(Liebenau, 1988, p. 118). Carl Bosch, the CEO of IG Farben explained
that “[R&D] is not there to give big proﬁts to our shareholders.
Our guide and our duty is to work for those who come after us
to establish the processes on which they will work” (Hayes, 1987;
von Tunzelmann, 1995). Usually big projects required ten years of
research, yielded ten years of substantial returns and another ten
years of sagging returns, according to Bosch. ICI held similar views
on its ﬂedgling pharmaceutical business.
Business history encompasses many cases in which shareholder
activism leads to curtailment of R&D spending. Curtiss-Wright, for
example, a leading American aircraft ﬁrm in the 1930s, planned a
post-war R&D budget of $36m ($290m in 2005 dollars and $2.0bn
as GDP-share). After a campaign of key shareholders the R&D bud-
get was slashed and partially paid out as dividend. Subsequently
the CW-20 plane failed and Curtiss-Wright had to leave airframe
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anufacturing to become a major component maker (Sutton, 1998,
. 431). The case appears to corroborate Christensen’s (2008) cri-
ique on the overuse of ﬁnancial tools for R&D-planning.
Another way to obtain cash was an initial public offering (IPO)
n a stock market. The modern stock market developed during
he nineteenth century in tandem with the new incorporation
aws. In Victorian Britain and in the United States listing require-
ents were lax and early-stage ﬁrms were ﬂoated in industries
uch as cars, cinema, music, planes and electricity. Although many
ocused on the application of proven innovations, such as the rail-
ay companies, bicycle manufacturers and cinema operators, a
ew concerned research into unproven technologies (Michie, 1981,
988).
As regulation became stronger it became more difﬁcult for new
ndustries to get cash through IPOs. After 1945 the modern venture
apital industry emerged, which grew faster when, in 1971, the
ASDAQ opened. This exchange had lower listing requirements,
hich were even further relaxed in the 1980s. A symbiosis emerged
n which the ﬂotation option stimulated venture capital because
roﬁtable exit was now possible without positive cash ﬂow. An IPO
lso released continuous information about how others valuated
he venture. If anybody knew more about its true value it should
how in price movements and short selling.
Although it has been almost impossible to get cash through an
PO exclusively for early-stage R&D, from the perspective of the
rm, a stock market ﬂotation solved the issue of sunk costs, as
o regular interest payments were needed. It probably also mit-
gated the pressure of the time lag, especially if governance was
ather imperfect. For investors, the stock market partially miti-
ated the sunk costs problem and the time lag, since shares were
ow readily tradable and an investor could exit any time. It also
educed uncertainty because in theory the stock price contained
erfect information, containing all relevant persons’ views on the
xpected pay-off of the ﬁrms sunk R&D-outlays.
Another way to obtain cash for R&D was through mergers and
cquisitions, referred to simply as ‘mergers’ hereafter. We  restrict
urselves here to mergers by large ﬁrms. We  will ignore the buying
f small technology ﬁrms by big ﬁrms; our main focus is on the
erger as a device for increasing cash ﬂow. Mergers mitigated the
unk costs problem when the merged ﬁrm had larger absolute cash
ows, allowing more, larger scale and longer-term R&D-projects,
ven if the R&D/sales ratio actually fell. On the supply side mergers
llowed more R&D to be done as there was a larger market share
ith a larger cash ﬂow, while at the same time on the demand side
 larger market share meant that R&D once it was ﬁnished, could
e rolled out more quickly and enjoy shorter pay-back periods.
The trusts in the late nineteenth century United States did
ot get many cash ﬂow advantages, because member companies
emained separate entities. In the wake of the antitrust acts, when
rms needed to merge if they wanted to set prices legally, the cash
ow to merged ﬁrms increased and a sharp rise in R&D-outlays
as initiated (Nicholas, 2003). A clear historical example of M&As
eading to more cash ﬂow and then to more R&D is the chemi-
al industry in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century. DuPont in
he United States and IG Farben in Germany became gigantic ﬁrms
ith enormous R&D budgets and long time horizons. Escalating
&D costs persuaded the individual ﬁrms to form IG Farben in
925 (Freeman, 1963). In 1928, Standard Oil of New Jersey paid
n unprecedented $35m ($330m in 2005 dollars, and $4.3bn as
005 GDP-share) for the rights to IG Farben’s patent portfolio out-
ide of Germany (Table 5). In Britain, ICI, within four years after its
926 merger quadrupled its R&D budget to £1m,  about a quar-
er of all R&D done in Britain and three quarters of that in the
hemical industry, rising to £1.4m in 1939, about 17 percent of
ll British R&D (Hannah, 1983, p. 113). As noted above, ICI had
 very long-term horizon and was willing, for example, to sink2 (2013) 1793– 1814 1807
cash in pharmaceuticals for over twenty years without seeing any
proﬁt.
Having many divisions, these ﬁrms could take a longer term
perspective, as they could sustain negative cash ﬂow in one division
for some time, allowing longer payback periods. Absent a market
for R&D-cash, capital markets could only do this very imperfectly
on their own, and ﬁrms with multiple business units were needed.
Cassiman et al. (2005), for example, ﬁnd a strong increase in R&D
if merging ﬁrms have complementary technologies.
Another example of an industry in which mergers were impor-
tant for R&D-ﬁnancing was  civil aviation, which, starting from
relatively modest development costs in the 1920s, became one
of the most R&D-intensive industries. Aircraft manufacturer Dou-
glas, for example, struggled under the burden of escalating
R&D-spending (Table 5) and the rapid expansion of production
of its best-selling but underpriced DC-9 plane. Sutton (1998, pp.
447–448) argues that when Douglas reported proﬁts of only $4m
in the ﬁrst quarter of 1966, the stock market began to look askance
at the company’s recent accounting change under which it stopped
writing off R&D-outlays as they occurred, but entered them in the
accounts as an asset under deferred charges, thus enhancing appar-
ent proﬁtability. The company’s stock price collapsed by 75 percent,
and the company needed a cash injection of $400m. It was only
saved by a merger with McDonnell. Thirty years later R&D-costs
had become so high that even the merged company could not afford
them anymore and merged in its turn with Boeing.
Mergers mitigated technical uncertainty by joining the R&D of
two ﬁrms, and strategic uncertainty by taking out another innova-
tor that could launch competing products. Market uncertainty was
alleviated by having a larger market share, making the launching of
new products easier, and proﬁt uncertainty was  reduced by having
a larger cash ﬂow from the enlarged market share to pay for ﬁxed
costs. This probably also reduced the time lag between the start of
sales and actual proﬁts.
Adverse selection and moral hazard were mitigated by not using
external ﬁnance to fund R&D, but by bringing another, external
source of cash ﬂow inside the ﬁrm through merger. The acquirer
could mitigate adverse selection by approaching targets itself,
rather than by responding to overtures by ﬁrms wanting to be
bought. Acquisitions were also a way  to buy a bundle of R&D
projects that there difﬁcult to separate from each other and from
the ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge of the target ﬁrm.
Sometimes the target ﬁrm could be capitalised on the acquirer’s
balance sheet and written off in several years, meaning that the
target’s R&D became capitalised (Lev, 1999). Whether the acquired
R&D was immediately written off or capitalised, an approximate
momentary valuation of it had taken place because of the mar-
ket transaction, much like a solar eclipse revealing information
about the sun. While in the United States since 1974 expenditure
on R&D has to be written off immediately, several other countries
allow ﬁrms to capitalise acquired and/or their own R&D (Lev and
Sougiannis, 1996). Only in some industries, however, was R&D a
large part of the acquired ﬁrm.
R&D by a multinational enterprise is of course a special form of
using cash ﬂow from existing operations to ﬁnance R&D. It mer-
its separate treatment as the multinational provided a mechanism
that helped this cash to cross borders. The hypothesis that multi-
nationals exist to arbitrate in capital has been questioned at least
since the 1960s (Jones, 2000). However, in the case of R&D, instead
of arbitrating in capital, multinationals arbitrated in R&D-cash, for
which no market existed and which had no law of one price, and
therefore could only cross borders through a particular institution,
such as the multinational ﬁrm.
Modern multinational enterprises emerged during the late nine-
teenth century and became prominent during the ﬁrst half of the
twentieth century. They undoubtedly expanded abroad for many
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ther reasons than R&D (Jones, 2000). Yet, as Buckley and Casson
1991) argue, after 1945 ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge became a key
river of the expansion of the multinational enterprise, which
ecame “an international intelligence system for the acquisition
nd collection of basic knowledge relevant to R&D”.
Between the 1960s and the 1990s, for example, electronic
nd pharmaceutical multinationals’ Foreign Direct Investment
FDI) existed for eighty percent of greenﬁeld investments, in
he majority of cases exploiting their ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge
Kuemmerle, 1999). More recently, Unn and Cuervo-Cazurra (2008)
ound that subsidiaries of multinationals used less external R&D
han domestic ﬁrms, because they could use their parent’s R&D,
nd Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer (2010) found that local ﬁrms
n transition economies such as those in Eastern Europe were
ess innovative and productive than foreign-owned ﬁrms, and
ttributed this to their difﬁculty in attracting capital and presum-
bly also cash for innovation (see also Nicholas, 2011).
The multinational had particular knowledge combined with a
ile of cash, and this allowed it to sink outlays that domestic
rms could not sink because they lacked either the knowledge
r the cash. The multinationals’ foreign cash ﬂow mitigated the
unk costs problem, its knowledge technical uncertainty, its inter-
ational distribution network market and proﬁt uncertainty. If it
ought stakes in existing ﬁrms, its technical knowledge helped
o mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard, while its interna-
ional market knowledge helped it to better valuate the target than
omestic ﬁrms.14
A major form for the ﬁnancing of early-stage R&D is venture
apital. A large literature exists on venture capital and here we
ill only discuss it brieﬂy in terms of our obstacles and in a his-
orical perspective. Early forms of ﬁnancing resembling venture
apital existed already in Britain during the Industrial Revolu-
ion, the venture capitalists being called ‘projectors’ (Brunt, 2006;
llen, 2009). A century later, in Victorian Britain, many venture
apital-like investments were placed in ﬁrms in new industries
hat were subsequently ﬂoated on the stock exchange (Michie,
981, 1988). Modern venture capital emerged in the 1940s in the
nited States, and its history has been well-documented elsewhere
Lerner, 2009). Its evolution was dependent on large-scale govern-
ent cash outlays on defence and health R&D. American Research
nd Development Corporation, set up and run by Georges F. Doriot
n 1946, is widely considered to be one of the ﬁrst venture capital
rms. It made a huge proﬁt from an investment in Digital Equip-
ent Corporation. ARD was followed by many other ﬁrms, and
everal regulatory changes helped spur a boom in venture capital.
rom 1971 technology companies could be ﬂoated on the NAS-
AQ stock exchange, reducing the time lag in which investments
ere locked-in, and in 1981 NASDAQ listing requirements were fur-
her relaxed. In the late 1970s jurisprudence allowed pension funds
nd endowments to invest in venture capital. Relaxed Californian
abour law allowed employees to rapidly switch between different
rms in the same industry: they could leave a ﬁrm and work at a
elated ﬁrm the next week. Unlike their East Coast counterparts,
alifornian employers were unable to prevent this because of the
nenforceability of post-employment covenants not to compete
Saxenian, 1994; Gilson, 1999; Bankman and Gilson, 1999). Since
he 1970s, large corporations also spun off research into separate
entures. General Electric was one of the ﬁrst ﬁrms to have a ded-
cated programme for this. In the 1980s the Bayh-Dole Act (1980)
nd the Federal Technology Transfer Act (1986) were introduced
hat facilitated the commercial exploitation of inventions from uni-
ersities and government labs (Mowery, 2009).
14 For a detailed historical case study on the role of knowledge and sunk costs in
he  evolution of multinationals see Bakker (2006).2 (2013) 1793– 1814
Already in the 1920s Knight (1921, p. 333) mentioned the pos-
sibility of an entrepreneur specialising in setting up many new
ventures and others investing in him; the investors can assess his
track record in organising new ventures. Knight called this ‘capitali-
sation of the entrepreneurial function’ and also discussed how, with
more ventures in one enterprise, errors could cancel each other out.
From the innovator’s perspective, venture capital mitigated the
sunk costs and time lag problems by providing long-term cash
in steps upon the achievement of technical milestones. From the
capitalist’s perspective, the sunk cost problem was largely solved
through ﬁve different factors. Initial discovery costs were often
borne by universities or government labs, with the venture cap-
italists only picking the survivors. Staged ﬁnancing limited the
cash sunk until the next decision point. Unlike corporate R&D-labs
individual ventures were clearly separated and could be closed
down quickly and smoothly. Finally, often a life insurance policy
was taken out on key scientists.
The investor’s uncertainty problem was  partially solved by tech-
nical milestones, enabling the frequent reassessment of a project’s
prospects, and by betting on industries through portfolio invest-
ing, rather than on individual ventures. Patents protected against
imitation and enabled funding, because they allowed the revela-
tion of technical details. The time lag problem was  mitigated by
the possibility to ﬂoat ventures early on the stock market, or to sell
it to large corporations. Adverse selection was  alleviated by having
scientists on the ﬁnancer’s board, by knowledge gained through
funding multiple projects in one technical area and by investing
in consortia with other venture capital ﬁrms with knowledgeable
managers. Picking only the successful projects from universities
and government labs that generated large amounts of inventions
without a proﬁt motive, also reduced adverse selection. Moral haz-
ard was reduced by giving key scientists equity stakes and stock
options, having seats on the board of start-ups and by regular site
visits. In this way, venture capital ﬁrms could provide an incentive
system for key scientists, that large corporations found difﬁcult to
provide (Zucker et al., 1998).
A ﬁnancing method related to venture capital was that of the
external research and development ﬁnancing organisation (RDFO).
Firms with a low marginal tax rate that lacked a sufﬁcient cash
ﬂow or a cash pile to ﬁnance R&D from, put a speciﬁc, separa-
ble part of their research in a RDFO, in which outside investors
with high marginal tax rates then invested, with the research in
progress and patents as collateral (Beatty et al., 1995). The immedi-
ate tax deductibility of R&D was thus sold to investors, who valued
it more, though Beatty et al. (1995) caution that taxes were likely
not the only reason for the use of RDFOs. RDFO-type organisa-
tions were established after 1974 and RDFOs became widely used
between 1980 and 1986, when over 150 were formed, raising over
$1 billion per year at their peak (Beatty et al., 1995). They were
often used by cash-constrained venture capital backed technology
ﬁrms. Beatty et al. ﬁnd that transaction costs and investor’s con-
cerns about adverse selection and moral hazard made the cost for
the R&D-ﬁrm about two  to three times that of a ‘seasoned equity
offering’, and therefore RDFOs were mainly used by ﬁrms that
were seriously cash-constrained. In 1982, Genentech, for example,
raised $50 million by putting the further development and test-
ing of manufacturing processes and alternative delivery systems
for human growth hormone and gamma  interferon in a sepa-
rate entity underwritten by outside investors (Beatty et al., 1995,
p. 416).4.2. Semi-public and public institutions
The private institutions discussed above were embedded in
other layers of semi-public and public institutions, as well as
G
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Table 7
The mitigation of R&D-ﬁnancing obstacles by selected institutional cash allocation mechanisms, for the innovator and the external ﬁnancer.
Institution Since: circa Example Source Scale Stage Obstacles to R&D-ﬁnancing mitigated
Inherent Transactional Total number
mitigated
I/E S/L E/L Sunk costs Uncertainty Time lag Adverse selection Moral hazard
Private
Self-ﬁnancing <1750 Power loom (1785) Internal Small Mixed 1 – – 1 1 3
Angel  investors 1750/1850 Spinning jenny (1767) External Small Earlier 1/– –/– 1/– 1 1 4/2
Free  cash ﬂow 1750/1850 Oil engine (1883) Internal Large All 1 – 1 1 1 4
Stock  market/equity 1850/1900 Artiﬁcial silk (1904) External Large Later 1/1 –/1 1/1 1 1 4/5
Mergers  & acquisitions 1850/1900 ICI/Nylon (1926/40) Ext./Int. Large All 1 1 – 1 1 4
Multinational enterprises 1900/1930 Viagra/sildenaﬁl (1989) Internal Large All 1 1 – 1 1 4
Venture  capital 1950/1980 Gene sequencing (1970s) External Small Earlier 1/1 1/1 1/1 1 1 5/5
RDFO  1980/2000 Genentech/hormone(1982) External Mixed Later 1/–- –/– –/– – – 1/–
Semi-public
Universities 1850/1900 Stanford (1950s -) External Mixed Earlier 1 1 1 1 – 4
Independent labs 1850/1900 Edison/carbon light (1879) Int./Ext. Mixed Earlier 1 1 – – – 2
Industry association labs 1900/1930 Agricultural innovations External Mixed Earlier 1 1 – 1 1 4
Public
Use  of government R&D 1750/1850 Manhattan Project (1941) External Large Earlier 1 1 1 1 – 4
Government R&D contracts 1930/1950 Apollo Project (1961) External Large Earlier 1/– 1/– 1/– 1/– 1/– 5/0
Grant  of indeﬁnite legal monopoly 1930/1950 British postal and tele-
Communications (1869)
Internal Large All 1 1 1 1 1 5
Legal-institutional
Property rights per se <1750 Largest telescope (c. 1800) Int./Ext. Mixed Mixed 1/1 1/1 –/– 1 1 4/3
Prizes  <1750 Ship’s clock (1736) External Mixed Later –/1 1/1 –/1 1 1 3/5
Intellectual property Rights 1750/1850 IG Farben portfolio transfer
(1929)
Int./Ext. Mixed Mixed 1/1 1/1 1/1 1 1 5/4
Knowledge-sharing 1850/1900 Two shipbuilders (1888) Ext./Int. Mixed Mixed 1 1 – 1 1 4
Total  (no.) 18 9/14 11/15 16/11 17/5 13/5 9/4 16 14 69/21
Total  (%) 100 50/78 61/83 89/61 94/63 72/63 50/50 89 78 77/53
Source: See text; see Tables 4 and 5.
Notes: within the four categories the cash allocation mechanisms are listed in broad chronological order. “Since” does not refer to an exact year but instead refers to the period in which the institution became widespread. The
scale  and stage for each institution have been assessed for the typical R&D-project in the respective category. “1” signiﬁes that the institution mitigates the relevant obstacle; “–” signiﬁes that it does not mitigate the relevant
obstacle,  where two values appear, the ﬁrst reﬂect the innovator’s perspective, the second the ﬁnancer’s perspective. RDFO: R&D Financing Organisation (see Beatty et al., 1995). For the independent research lab, the obstacles to
the  commissioner of the research are assessed. Internal ﬁnancing, almost per deﬁnition, strongly mitigates the two transactional obstacles.
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n legal-institutional instruments.15 The major semi-public insti-
ution that helped ﬁrms ﬁnance R&D was the university. In
id-nineteenth century Britain, several industrialists helped fund
niversities that included technical subjects, and many older uni-
ersities also embraced those subjects more fully (Sanderson,
972b). Likewise, from the mid-nineteenth century most German
hemical ﬁrms used nearby university professors under consult-
ng contracts. Many new products emerged from these, and their
tudents staffed the growing corporate R&D-labs. Similarly, in
he United States in the interwar period, new pharmaceutical
rms would locate close to universities (Furman and MacGarvie,
007).
Universities mitigated the sunk costs problem by bearing the
osts of the ‘misses’, leaving the hits for ﬁrms to exploit. By
earing the ﬁxed costs of a large existing research infrastructure
hey reduced the size of the ﬁxed costs ﬁrms needed to incur.
ncertainty for ﬁrms was mitigated if university staff had already
creened out unpromising leads, and when ﬁrms consulted univer-
ity staff, they were assured by the hiring and publishing criteria in
cademia that they passed a minimum quality threshold. The uni-
ersity also shortened time lags, by performing the earliest-stage
&D, so that the clock only started ticking when a ﬁrm licensed
t and began to sink cash. As noted in the discussion of venture
apital above, adverse selection in the licensing of university inno-
ations was probably low as they were non-proﬁt institutions, and
ften ﬁrms approached universities rather than vice versa. In the
ate twentieth century universities sometimes may  have become
ore proactive in pursuing revenues from scientiﬁc advances that
merged in the university, but the university organisations as
 whole remained generally not-for-proﬁt organisations heavily
ependent on donations and endowments, and the set of scientiﬁc
rojects from which promising technologies were selected for com-
ercial licensing was probably not strongly affected by commercial
otivations (Mansﬁeld, 1991, 1998).
Another semi-public institution was the industry association
ab, where sunk costs were shared across an industry, so reducing
trategic uncertainty. They became prevalent in interwar Britain
Sanderson, 1972a; Edgerton and Horrocks, 1994). Private inde-
endent research labs fulﬁlled a slightly similar function and had
een in existence since at least the late nineteenth century. A prime
xample was the Edison Lab, which besides working on its own
nventions, also had many contracts with outside ﬁrms (Dodgson
nd Gann, 2010, p. 92).
Besides private and semi-public ways to raise cash for R&D,
ublic institutions were also important. The major ones were
overnment laboratories, government R&D-contracts awarded to
rivate ﬁrms, and state monopolies. Direct research by govern-
ent laboratories helped ﬁrms to ﬁnance R&D in a way  broadly
imilar to exploiting university research. Agricultural, defence and
ealth R&D-labs have all been important. The U.S. National Insti-
utes of Health, for example, have generated many inventions
hat were developed further by companies, such as the ﬁrst HIV-
edicine.
Another public institution was the government funding of R&D
arried out by ﬁrms. Before the Second World War  direct funding of
&D-projects by governments was less common. In the U.S. aircraft
ndustry, for example, the Department of Defence would ask manu-
acturers to show off their prototypes on an airstrip at a certain date,
nd then chose one model to be manufactured (O’Sullivan, 2007).
n interwar Britain, the government subsidised laboratories set up
y industry associations, and ﬁnanced several research-intensive
15 On the multiple layers of institutional arrangements in which particular cases
re  embedded, see, for example, Ostrom (1990).2 (2013) 1793– 1814
programmes, such as the airship programme between 1924 and
1930 (Edgerton and Horrocks, 1994, p. 225).
After 1945, governments increasingly started to fund R&D
directly through contracting. Alic (2013) provides a detailed his-
torical study of U.S. defence contracting after 1945, showing how
R&D became one of the largest components. Government R&D-
contracts mitigated sunk costs, especially with cost-plus contracts,
as the government paid for them, they lowered strategic uncer-
tainty as it was  usually known if the government contracted with
other ﬁrms as well, and it reduced market uncertainty, as the sin-
gle buyer had signalled it was  interested in the innovation. The
time-lag was also less pressing as there was already a positive cash
ﬂow in the R&D-phase through government payments. However,
the ﬁrm did need to overcome adverse selection problems and
had to ﬁnd a way to signal to the government that it was a reli-
able contractor to carry out the R&D. A potential solution was for
the government to approach the ﬁrm rather than vice versa. The
ﬁrm might also submit to regular monitoring to overcome moral
hazard.
Another public institution was the awarding of a monopoly by
the state—often, but not always to a ﬁrm that was  state-owned. An
early example was the awarding of a monopoly to postal and tele-
graph services in Britain in the late nineteenth century. A prime
modern example was  the telecom industry in Europe and North
America during most of the twentieth century. Many ﬁrms main-
tained large central laboratories, the most famous of which was Bell
Labs, which spawned several Nobel Laureates. The labs often lacked
a clear proﬁt-motive and legitimacy to maximise revenue. Under
pressure from anti-trust suits, Bell Labs, for example, licensed its
technology for a minimal fee.
Monopolies alleviated the sunk cost problem, as the monopolist
could set prices to ensure a certain amount of cash ﬂow. It also
reduced strategic, market and proﬁt uncertainty by the absence of
competitors. Time lags became also less pressing, for better or for
worse, by the absence of competitors and the steady, guaranteed
cash ﬂow that could pay for R&D. Given the monopoly, external
ﬁnancers might even willingly ﬁnance the R&D.
4.3. Legal-institutional instruments
Other devices that helped ﬁrms ﬁnance R&D were legal-
institutional solutions such as property rights per se, prizes, patents
and knowledge sharing. The awarding of innovation prizes had
been a tried and tested method. An iconic prize was the English
Board of Longitude Prize (1716). For the innovator, a prize did not
mitigate the sunk costs problem, but it did reduce proﬁt uncertainty
because of the guaranteed pay-off. However, a prize increased
strategic uncertainty by encouraging more ﬁrms to enter the race,
with a second innovator often not receiving anything. The time lag
also became more pressing, as competitive pressure was high and
prizes often carried a deadline.
From the prize-ﬁnancer’s perspective, the sunk costs prob-
lem was fully solved, because cash only needed to be paid upon
a working innovation, and in theory the innovation could even
function as collateral for external ﬁnance: it is conceivable that a
bank would agree to lend the funds for the prize once it had to
be awarded, given that the underlying, now proven, innovation
could be expected to yield future revenues. Technical, strategic
and market uncertainty were largely borne by the prize contes-
tants. Proﬁt uncertainty might have been higher, as given the many
entrants and their ownership of partial property rights it was
unclear whether and how the innovator could proﬁt. Usually the
prize was  awarded by a government or private non-proﬁt organ-
isation for an innovation of public beneﬁt, on the condition that
it was placed in the public domain. The inventor of celluloid, for
example, did not claim a prize because it meant giving away the
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ntellectual property rights. Because of the ex-post character, the
rize also perfectly solved adverse selection and moral hazard for
ts ﬁnancers.
A social disadvantage was the risk of overspending on a partic-
lar R&D-trajectory. The $10m Ansari X-Prize for the ﬁrst private
uman space ﬂight, for example, resulted in total R&D outlays by
ll contestants of $100m. Brunt et al. (2012) have identiﬁed a mul-
itude of prizes for agricultural innovations in nineteenth century
ritain and ﬁnd that they fostered innovation. Recently ﬁrms have
lso started to use prizes as a way to ﬁnance their R&D. A web-
ite, for example, offers ﬁrms to post their scientiﬁc problem and
he award they will pay for the ﬁrst working solution, with the
ebsite as guarantor to inventors.16 There are, of course, obvious
isadvantages to this technique.
Another well-known legal-institutional mechanism was the
atent. Patents mitigated the innovator’s sunk costs problem
lightly, because an unsuccessful R&D-project might still yield
atents that could be sold or used to block a competitor. Patents
educed strategic, market and proﬁt uncertainty by increasing
mitation costs, and they made the time lag less pressing by delay-
ng imitation. They also helped innovators to reduce the adverse
election problem as they could reveal more when they talked to
xternal ﬁnancers.
Another legal-institutional institution was knowledge sharing.
ineteenth century shipyards, for example, sometimes agreed
o offer to each other all innovations they developed (MacLeod,
999), and in the interwar period several large knowledge-sharing
rrangements were signed, such as the famous patents and pro-
esses agreement between ICI and DuPont (Hannah, 1983, p. 117).
nowledge sharing agreements often gave access to innovations
hat had yet to be made at the moment of signing.
.4. Comparing the institutions
Putting all the solutions to the R&D-ﬁnancing problem we  dis-
ussed in one diagram (Table 7) shows various R&D-cash allocation
olutions that emerged at different points in history and, through
urvival, now all coexist together, offering the substantial menu
f solutions that characterises today’s society. Besides the pri-
ate/public classiﬁcation which we have used as the main ordering
rinciple of the various cash allocation solutions, they also can be
lassiﬁed, of course, according to whether the ﬁnance is internal or
xternal, whether projects are smaller or larger and whether they
re in an earlier or a later stage (Table 7).
From the innovator’s perspective the institutions that mitigated
ll ﬁve obstacles were, in chronological order, intellectual property
ights, government R&D and venture capital. From the ﬁnancer’s
erspective, institutions mitigating all obstacles were prizes and
enture capital. Clearly venture capital is the only institution that
itigated all obstacles for both parties, and perhaps this explains
ts current popularity in ﬁnancing particular kinds of R&D. Venture
apital, was, of course, dependent on the rise of semi-public and
ublic R&D and intellectual property rights.
Institutions mitigating fewest of the obstacles were, for innova-
ors, independent research labs, closely followed by self-ﬁnancing
nd prizes. For the ﬁnancers they were government R&D contracts
where the government is considered the ﬁnancer), followed at
ome distance by angel investors, and those followed again by prop-
rty rights per se and the stock market.17 Prizes and government
&D-contracts were the most asymmetric institutions. Prizes mit-
gated all obstacles for the prize-ﬁnancer, but left sunk costs and
16 http://www.kaggle.com.
17 Alic (2013) provides an intriguing historical study of the inefﬁciencies in gov-
rnment contracting of U.S. defence R&D since 1945.2 (2013) 1793– 1814 1811
the time lag unresolved for the innovator, while government R&D-
contracts mitigated all obstacles for the innovator but none for the
ﬁnancer (the government).
The obstacles that were easiest to mitigate with some insti-
tutional solution were, for innovators, sunk costs and adverse
selection, and, for ﬁnancers, uncertainty. The high score of uncer-
tainty mitigation is partially due to intellectual property rights
safeguarding value capture, and stock markets/IPO’s delivering
continuous information on the aggregate valuation of a project. The
most difﬁcult to mitigate obstacles were, for innovators, the time
lag and, for ﬁnancers, the time lag, adverse selection and moral haz-
ard. The fact that the time lag is the hardest to mitigate obstacle for
both parties, reﬂects the observations of Schumpeter, Keynes and
Hicks that the time lag and the roundaboutness of the production
process is one of the central features of capitalism, and absent from
static equilibrium models.
5. Conclusion
We have examined the pattern of aggregate R&D spending in the
very long run, since c. 1750, as well as how ﬁrms were able to incur
large R&D outlays on particular, highly uncertain projects, in the
face of substantial ﬁnancing obstacles, following the historical case
study approach of Chandler (1962) and the analytical-historical
approaches of North (1981) and Williamson (1985). The particu-
lar R&D-project has been the key unit of analysis, and this is what
makes this paper distinctive from studies focusing on aggregate
ﬁrm outlays, national outlays or general non-ﬁnancial aspects of
R&D.
We have noted how the ﬁnancing of R&D historically was made
difﬁcult by ﬁve challenges: the fact that R&D was characterised
by sunk costs, real uncertainty, long and open-ended time lags
between outlays and pay-offs, adverse selection, and moral hazard.
The implication of these challenges was  that ﬁrms needed cash,
not capital, for R&D-projects. This has been corroborated by our
review of studies on contemporary R&D-ﬁnancing which in many
instances concluded that ﬁrms’ R&D expenditures were highly sen-
sitive to cash ﬂow.
We  found that the long-run pattern of R&D spending, both in
Britain and the United States, revealed sharp growth, often several
times faster than GDP-growth, from the turn of the century to the
1970s, with subsequent growth being equal to or lower than GDP-
growth. We  also highlighted how little is known about aggregate
R&D-expenditure before 1900.
For case studies of particular R&D-projects, we introduced three
methods to measure project costs. Besides using GDP-deﬂated costs
and costs relative to GDP, we introduced the Empire State Index,
which uses the GDP-deﬂated construction costs of the Empire State
Building as a comparator. We found that even long before 1900
some R&D-projects had a non-insigniﬁcant scale: eighteenth cen-
tury projects such as the ship’s clock, the spinning jenny and the
water frame all required substantial outlays. We  also noted the
enormous variation in costs and time lags of R&D projects: the
costs varied between as much as seven orders of magnitude, mean-
ing that the largest project in our case set was in the order of one
to ten million times bigger than the smallest project. The time
lag varied from about minus twenty to about plus twenty years.
For catalytic cracking, aircraft and chemicals we also found some
further evidence of the low-hanging fruit hypothesis—that R&D-
outlays were increasing disproportionately along a technological
trajectory. We  also observed that despite the smaller British home
market, British ﬁrms were able to engage in R&D-projects that
were on a similar scale to major U.S. projects, such as ICI’s wartime
nuclear research, its terylene project and Beecham’s semisynthetic
antibiotics project. This is consistent with the ﬁndings of Edgerton
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nd Horrocks (1994) and nuances Mowery and Rosenberg’s (1989)
ccount that British R&D was substantially behind that of the United
tates before 1940.
The historical facts that aggregate R&D-outlays grew faster than
DP-growth for a long time, and that particular large-scale R&D-
rojects have existed at least since the mid-eighteenth century,
uggest that, despite the challenges to the ﬁnancing of R&D, ﬁrms
ere able to incur R&D outlays for large and uncertain projects.
This ﬁnding is not unrelated to other work on institutions.
strom (1990), for example, ﬁnds that although classical eco-
omic theory predicts that common pool resources such as ﬁshing
rounds, commons or water supply will be depleted without
overnment intervention, communities developed many different
ays to govern their common pool resources, and that in practice
ew were depleted. Likewise, we noticed how ﬁrms and societies
n practice proved creative and resourceful in ﬁnding solutions to
hat in theory should be an insurmountable ﬁnancing problem.
We reviewed a series of cash allocation mechanisms that they
eveloped for this purpose over time and that allowed them to sink
ver larger amounts of cash in R&D-projects. We  argue that these
olutions to R&D-ﬁnancing often served many other purposes, but
hat they also allowed ﬁrms to ﬁnance R&D, and increasingly so
fter 1945. Private institutions we reviewed included self-ﬁnancing
y individuals, angel investors, free cash ﬂow from existing oper-
tions, IPOs, mergers, multinational organisations, venture capital
nd R&D ﬁnancing organisations. Semi-public and public institu-
ions included universities, industry association labs, government
abs, government R&D-contracts and state-sanctioned monopolies.
egal-institutional instruments we reviewed included property
ights per se, prizes, patents and knowledge sharing. We  found that
he only institution that mitigated all ﬁve obstacles for ﬁnancer and
nnovator alike was venture capital. The most asymmetric solutions
ere prizes and government contracts: the former left important
hallenges for the innovator, while the latter mitigated few obsta-
les for the ﬁnancer (the government).
We  need to see these solutions in the context of a sharp jump
n the size of the national market, by more than two  orders of
agnitude in Britain between 1736 and the present, and by more
han three orders of magnitude in the United States between 1790
nd today, in the context of new technologies that increased the
ffectiveness of R&D such as the periodic table, systematic soil
ampling, the integrated circuit, or DNA-sequencing (Moser, 2012),
nd, ﬁnally, in the context of large public spending increases on
&D through which the pubic sector bore part of the sunk costs and
inimum project outlays. Further research could explore ways to
rrive at an estimate of aggregate R&D expenditure before 1900,
nd establish whether the history of R&D in other high-growth
ountries, such as Germany and Japan, ﬁtted the British and Amer-
can pattern.
The main implications of our research are, ﬁrst, that cash is
ssential for ﬁnancing R&D-projects: especially in times of ﬁnancial
rises, when the cash supply tends to dry up, policymakers might
hink about how to stimulate R&D. Second, a ﬂexible legal frame-
ork is conducive for organisational experimentation and so allows
rms to develop new organisational and contractual arrangements
o ﬁnance R&D. Some argue that venture capital is relatively impor-
ant in the United States, Britain and Israel at least partially because
he common law in those countries affords substantial legal and
rganisational ﬂexibility (Gilson, 2001). Third, institutional ﬂexi-
ility is important in order to have a law-making and regulation
rocess that can adjust the legal framework and so allows for
hanges over time that can be conducive for R&D. In the United
tates, for example, institutional ﬂexibility allowed relaxed Cali-
ornian labour laws, the founding of the NASDAQ, the loosening
f pension fund investment regulation, the relaxation of NASDAQ
isting requirements, the Bayh-Doyle Act and many other laws and2 (2013) 1793– 1814
regulations that stimulated outlays on R&D. Fourth, by taking the
project as unit of analysis and looking at the scale of particular
historical cases, we hope that with the Empire State Index, we
have provided an easy, intuitive comparative tool for policy mak-
ers, ﬁrms and academics to get a grip on the relative size of past
R&D projects and long-run trends.
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